(V) Typhoon- origins, aims and feasibility

by Luka Bilić

After analyzing Soviet resistance and German failings, in final part impact of the third reason that affected Typhoon is described- elements, and its impact on both sides

3. Weather

No one could possibly miss detrimental effects of the seasonal changes on German war machine. Rains turned the ‘roads into mud rivers which severely restricted movement and later deep freezing temperatures and snow painfully hit unprepared German armies. This isn’t in question. What is questionable is traditional German narrative on the matter where they act astonished by rains in autumn and cold in winter, like it wasn’t something absolutely normal, something they experienced in detail just 20 years before in ww1 and what in the words of one Wehrmacht general staff officer, ‘belonged to ABCs of eastern front’.

What’s more they conveniently omit their role in the mess they found themselves in. From childishly optimistic and recklessly planned Typhoon, to OKH ordering in September only three quarters of a million winter garments instead over 3 million. Still in September, with so much informations indicating the opposite, OKH was certain that Soviets would be beaten before winter and that only occupation forces will stay in Russia during winter. They were so sure of that that they were ready to gamble lives and limbs of own men to this frivolous and baseless assumption. In the end it was easy to say, weather surprised us!There was also complete contempt and dismissive attitude toward winter effects on Soviet operations. In reality of course they were greatly hampered. Deep snow during entire Soviet Moscow counter offensive for example meant that there was no tactical mobility off road even for new Soviet tanks or infantry.(Forczyk) Snow under 1m thickness was rare to find in countryside that winter, while KV tanks could deal with 60-70 cm of snow and T-34 with 70. Artillery towing ST-2 tractor could overcome 15-20 cm and GAZ AA trucks only 10-15 cm. In such circumstances only scarce sky troops could traverse the terrain freely while the rest were confined to roads. Red Army was forced to conduct frontal attacks every step of the way without possibility to flank German positions. This way even small German rearguards blocking the road would cause big problems for perusing Red Army, losses and delays. This was among other, important reason why Soviets failed to encircle and destroy AGC or at least larger part than they did.

David Stahel, one of top experts on the subject and master of German archives, summed it up very clearly:

-long postponement (of operations during summer), so often attributed to self imposed halt while strategic dispute played out between Hitler and part of the high command, was actually an inevitable delay brought on by supply shortages, need for extending the railways and unceasing Soviet offensives. When Hitler decided to strike towards Kiev, AGC gained time (some two months) to stockpile essential supplies, which still proved inadequate (when offensive went through in October)

-October supply crisis was a preordained fact, exacerbated by weather but not caused by it.

-..seizing Moscow therefore constituted a prohibitive delusion, logistically unworkable,willfully ignorant of the seasonal conditions and inexcusably dismissive of Soviet strength.

How the mighty had fallen to seek excuses for defeat of their supposedly invincible armies in perfectly normal seasonal changes..

To conclude, Typhoon had no chance of success and was surprising undertaking even for German command of that period. Barbarossa and an attempt to destroy SU in single blow were dead and jump starting this in form of Typhoon was a very bad idea, led by wishful thinking and little else. Germans should’ve by then realised that they are losing more than they are gaining and that it wouldn’t be possible to subdue the Soviets in one climactic campaign. Trying it only meant exhausting and willfully putting themselves in harm's way. Yet, by then prevailing nazi paradigm of supremacy of ‘will’ was deeply rooted in high command, as were other more sinister concepts like racial superiority and they clouded their judgement. Best chance Germans had was to try to defeat the Soviets in more defined campaigns aimed at specific strategic goals, while trying to be as sparing as possible to own resources, mechanised formations and transportation assets. This was luckily opposed to fanatical and irrational mindset of Hitler’s army.