Soviet-German non-aggression pact

        After the seizure of Czechoslovakia, fascist Germany began to prepare for war completely openly before the eyes of the whole world. Hitler, encouraged by England and France, ceased to stand on ceremony and pretend to be a supporter of a peaceful settlement of European problems. The most dramatic months of the pre-war period arrived. Even then it was clear that every day brings humanity closer to an unprecedented military catastrophe.

        What, then, was the policy of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the politics of Great Britain and France, on the other?

        An attempt to evade the answer to this question, undertaken by falsifiers of history in the USA, testifies only to their unclean conscience.

        The truth is that England and France, with the support of the ruling circles of the United States and in the fateful period of spring and summer of 1939, when the war was on the verge, continued their previous policy line. It was a policy of provocatively inciting Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union, disguised for deception not only by Pharisee phrases about readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, but also by some simple diplomatic

        maneuvers designed to hide from the public opinion of peoples the real nature of the current political course.

        Such maneuvers were, first of all, the negotiations of 1939, which Britain and France decided to strike up with the Soviet Union. To deceive public opinion, the Anglo-French ruling circles tried to portray these negotiations as a serious attempt to prevent the further spread of Nazi aggression. However, in the light of the whole course of events, it became completely clear that for the Anglo-French side, from the very beginning, these negotiations were only the next move in its double game.

        This was also clear to the leaders of Nazi Germany, for whom the meaning of the negotiations undertaken by the Governments of England and France with the Soviet Union did not, of course, provide a secret. Here is what, for example, the German ambassador in London Dirksen wrote about this in a report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 3, 1939, as evidenced by documents captured by the Soviet Army during the defeat of Nazi Germany:

        “The impression here prevailed that the ties that had arisen in recent months with other states were only a reserve means for genuine reconciliation with Germany, and that these ties would disappear as soon as the only important and worthy goal was reached - an agreement with Germany.”

        This opinion was firmly shared by all German diplomats who observed the situation in London.

        In his other secret report to Berlin, Dirksen wrote: “England wants to strengthen and equalize the axis through arms and acquiring allies, but

        at the same time, she wants to try, through negotiations, to come to an amicable agreement with Germany. "

        Slanderers and falsifiers of history try to hide these documents, for they shed bright light on the situation of the last pre-war months, without a correct assessment of which it is impossible to understand the real prehistory of the war. Engaging in negotiations with the Soviet Union and giving guarantees to Poland, Romania and some other states, England and France, with the support of the ruling circles of the United States, were playing a double game, designed for an agreement with Hitler Germany in order to direct its aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.

        Negotiations between England and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, began in March 1939 and lasted about four months.

        The entire course of these negotiations clearly showed that while the Soviet Union sought to reach a broad and equal agreement with the Western powers that could at least at the last moment keep Germany from starting a war in Europe, the governments of England and France, supported by support in The United States set completely different goals. The Anglo-French ruling circles, accustomed to raking in the heat of others, this time tried to impose obligations on the Soviet Union, by virtue of which the USSR would take upon itself the brunt of the victims to repel possible Hitler aggression, and England and France would not at all be bound or obligations to the Soviet Union.

        If the Anglo-French rulers succeeded in this maneuver, they would be much closer to

        1 Note by Dirksen, “On the Development of Political Relations between Germany and England during My Office Stay in London,” compiled in September 1939.

        to their main goal, which was to push Germany and the Soviet Union between their foreheads as soon as possible. However, this idea was unraveled by the Soviet Government, which at all stages of the negotiations opposed its open and clear proposals, designed to serve only one purpose, to defend peace in Europe, to the diplomatic tricks and tricks of the Western powers.

        There is no need to recall all the vicissitudes of these negotiations. Only some of the most important points should be recalled. It is enough to recall the conditions that the Soviet Government put forward in these negotiations: the conclusion between Britain, France and the USSR of an effective pact on mutual assistance against aggression; guarantee from England, France and the USSR of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including, without exception, all European countries bordering the USSR; the conclusion of a specific military agreement between England, France and the USSR on the forms and sizes of immediate and effective assistance to each other and guaranteed states in the event of an attack by aggressors.

        1 See Report of V.M. Molotov at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1939.

        At the third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1939 V.M. Molotov pointed out that in some Anglo-French proposals presented during these negotiations, there was no elementary principle of reciprocity and equal duties, binding on all equal agreements.

        “Having guaranteed itself,” said V. Molotov, “from a direct attack of aggressors by pacts of mutual assistance between themselves and Poland and providing themselves with help from the USSR in the event of aggressors attacking Poland and Romania, the British and French left open the question of whether the USSR could it’s the turn to rely on their help in case of direct aggression by aggressors, as well as left another question open - whether they can take part in guaranteeing small states bordering the USSR that cover the northwestern borders of C SSR, if they are unable to defend their neutrality from the attack of aggressors. Thus, the unequal position for the USSR turned out. ”

        Even when the Anglo-French representatives verbally began to agree with the principle of mutual assistance between England, France and the USSR on the basis of reciprocity in the event of a direct attack by the aggressor, they furnished this with a number of reservations that made this agreement fictitious.

        In addition, the Anglo-French proposals provided for assistance from the USSR to those countries to which the British and French made a promise of guarantees, but they did not say anything about their help to the countries on the north-western border of the USSR - the Baltic states, in the event of an attack by an aggressor.

        Based on the above considerations, V.M. Molotov said that the Soviet Union could not assume obligations with respect to certain countries without the same guarantees being given with respect to countries located on the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union.

        It should also be recalled that when, on March 18, 1939, the British ambassador in Moscow, Seeds asked the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, what would be the position of the Soviet Union in the case of Hitler aggression against Romania, about which the British had information, and when the question was raised from the Soviet side, what will be the position of England under such circumstances, Siids declined to answer, noting that geographically Romania is closer to the Soviet Union than to England.

        Thus, already from the first step, the desire of the British ruling circles to bind the Soviet Union with certain obligations and to remain on the sidelines was clearly revealed. The same simple technique was then systematically, again and again, repeated throughout the course of the negotiations.

        In response to an English request, the Soviet Government put forward a proposal to convene a meeting of representatives of the most interested states, namely: Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland, Turkey and the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Government, such a meeting would give the greatest opportunity to clarify the actual situation and determine the positions of all its participants. However, the British Government replied that it considered the Soviet proposal premature.

        Instead of convening a conference that would make it possible to agree on specific measures to combat aggression, the British Government invited the Soviet Government on March 21, 1939 to sign with him, as well as France and Poland, a declaration in which the signatory governments would undertake to "consult on those steps which must be undertaken for general resistance "in case of a threat to the" independence of any European state. " The British ambassador, proving the acceptability of his proposal, especially emphasized the fact that the declaration was drawn up in very few binding terms.

        It was clear that such a declaration could not serve as a serious means of fighting the impending threat from the aggressor. Believing, however, that even such a promising declaration could be at least some step forward in curbing the aggressor, the Soviet Government agreed to accept the English proposal. But already on April 1, 1939, the British ambassador in Moscow announced that England considered the issue of the joint declaration to be a bygone.

        After two more weeks of delay, the English Foreign Minister Halifax made to the Soviet Government through the ambassador in Moscow a new proposal that the Soviet Government make a statement that “in the event of an act of aggression against any European neighbor of the Soviet Union that would resist, it’s possible he will count on the help of the Soviet Government if it is desired. ”

        The main point of this proposal was that in the event of an act of aggression by Germany against Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, the Soviet Union was obliged to help them without any obligation to provide assistance from England, that is, to get involved in a war with Germany one on one. As for Poland and Romania, to which England gave guarantees, in this case the Soviet Union should have helped them against the aggressor. But in this case, England did not want to assume any obligations together with the Soviet Union, leaving itself free hands and the field for any maneuvering, not to mention the fact that, according to this proposal, Poland and Romania, as well as the Baltic states, didn’t pledged to the USSR.

        The Soviet Government, however, did not want to miss a single opportunity in order to reach an agreement with other powers on a joint struggle against Nazi aggression. Without any delay, it submitted a counter proposal to the British Government. This proposal was that, firstly, the Soviet Union, England and France mutually pledged to render each other all kinds of immediate assistance, including military assistance, in case of aggression against one of these states; secondly, that the Soviet Union, England and France undertake to provide all, including military, assistance to the states of Eastern Europe, located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the Soviet Union, in case of aggression against these states. Finally, thirdly, the Soviet Union, England and France were obligated to establish in a short time the size and forms of military assistance provided to each of these states in both cases mentioned above.

        These were the most important points of the Soviet proposal. It is not difficult to see the fundamental difference between the Soviet proposal and the British proposal, since the Soviet proposal contained truly effective measures to jointly counter aggression.

        For three weeks there was no response to this proposal from the English Government. This wrested growing concern in England, as a result of which the English Government finally had to come up with another maneuver to deceive public opinion.

        On May 8, an English response came to Moscow, or, more precisely, English counter-offers. The Soviet Government was again invited to make a unilateral statement, which it “would undertake if Britain and France were involved in hostilities in pursuance of their obligations” (to Belgium, Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey) “to render assistance immediately, if it would be desirable, and the kind and conditions under which this assistance would be provided would be the subject of an agreement. ”

        And this proposal dealt with the unilateral obligations of the Soviet Union. He was obliged to provide assistance to England and France, which for their part did not undertake absolutely any obligations to the Soviet Union with respect to the Baltic republics. Thus, England proposed to put the USSR in an unequal position, unacceptable and unworthy for any independent state.

        It is easy to understand that in reality the English proposal was addressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin. The Germans were invited to attack the Soviet Union and made it clear to them that Britain and France would remain neutral if the German attack was carried out through the Baltic states.

        On May 11, negotiations between the Soviet Union, England and France were further complicated by the statement of the Polish ambassador in Moscow Grzybowski that “Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR ...”

        Of course, such a statement by the Polish representative could only be made with the knowledge and approval of the ruling circles of England and France.

        The behavior of the English and French representatives in the negotiations in Moscow was so provocative that even in the ruling camp of the Western powers there were people who sharply criticized such a rude game. So in the summer of 1939 Lloyd George you

        set foot in the French newspaper "Ce Soire" with a sharp article directed against the leaders of British politics. Touching upon the reasons for the endless mess in which Britain and France entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union, Lloyd George wrote that only one answer to this question is possible: "Neville Chamberlain, Halifax and John Simon do not want any agreement with Russia."

        Of course, what was clear to Lloyd George was no less clear to the rulers of Nazi Germany, who perfectly understood that the Western powers did not even think about a serious agreement with the Soviet Union, but had a completely different goal. This goal was to push Hitler to an early attack on the Soviet Union, providing him with a bonus for this attack by creating the least favorable conditions for the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany.

        In addition, the Western powers have been dragging out negotiations with the Soviet Union endlessly, trying to drown significant issues in the mud of minor amendments and countless options. Each time when it came to any real obligations, representatives of these powers pretended not to understand what was happening.

        At the end of May, England and France introduced new proposals that somewhat improved the previous version, but still left open the question of guaranteeing the three Baltic republics located on the northwestern border of the Soviet Union, which was essential for the Soviet Union.

        Thus, making some verbal concessions under the pressure of the public opinion of their countries, the rulers of England and France continued to bend their former line, furnishing their proposals with such reservations that made them deliberately unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

        The behavior of the Anglo-French representatives during the negotiations in Moscow was so intolerant that V.M. Molotov was supposed on May 27, 1939 to inform the British ambassador Seeds and the French charge d'affaires Payar that the draft agreement they submitted on joint joint counteraction to the aggressor in Europe was not It contains a plan for organizing effective mutual assistance between the USSR, England and France, and does not even indicate the serious interest of the English and French Governments in the corresponding pact with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was bluntly stated that the Anglo-French proposal suggests that the Governments of England and France are not so much interested in the pact itself as in talking about it. It is possible that these conversations are needed by England and France for some purpose. The Soviet Government does not know these goals. The Soviet Government is not interested in talking about the pact, but in organizing effective mutual assistance of the USSR, Britain and France against aggression in Europe. Anglo-French representatives were warned that the Soviet Government did not intend to participate in conversations about the pact, the goals of which the USSR did not know, and that such conversations could be conducted by the English and French Governments with partners more suitable than the USSR.

        The Moscow talks dragged on endlessly. The reasons for such an unacceptable delay in negotiations were blurted out by the London Times, which wrote: “A quick and decisive alliance with Russia can impede other” negotiations ... ”1 The“ Times ”, speaking of“ other negotiations ”, obviously had in mind the talks of Robert Hudson , the British Minister for Overseas Trade, with Dr. Helmut Voltat, Hitler's economic adviser, on the possibility of an English loan to Hitler Germany in a very large amount, which will be discussed ahead.

        1 Seyere and Kahn, The Secret War against Soviet Russia, Moscow 1947, p. 371.

        In addition, as you know, on the day that the Nazi army entered Prague, according to the press, the delegation of the Federation of British Industry was in Dusseldorf negotiating a broad agreement with German large-scale industry.

        Attention was also drawn to the fact that negotiating on behalf of the United Kingdom in Moscow was entrusted to secondary persons, while Chamberlain himself traveled from England to Germany to negotiate with Hitler, and moreover, more than once. It is also important to note that the English representative of Strang, for negotiations with the USSR, did not have the authority to sign any agreements with the Soviet Union.

        In view of the demand of the Soviet Union to proceed to concrete negotiations on measures to combat a possible aggressor, the governments of England and France should have agreed to send their military missions to Moscow. However, these missions traveled to Moscow for an unusually long time, and when they arrived, it turned out that they were composed of minor persons who, moreover, did not have the authority to sign any agreement. Under these conditions, military negotiations turned out to be as fruitless as political ones.

        The military missions of the Western powers immediately showed that they did not want to talk seriously about mutual assistance in the event of German aggression. The Soviet military mission proceeded from the fact that the USSR, without a common border with Germany, could provide assistance to England, France, Poland, in the event of a war, only if the Soviet troops passed through Polish territory. However, the Polish Government stated that it would not accept military assistance from the Soviet Union, showing that it was more afraid of strengthening the Soviet Union than Nazi aggression. The position of Poland was supported by both the English and French missions.

        During the military negotiations, the question was also raised about the number of armed forces that should be immediately put forward by the parties to the agreement in case of aggression. Then the British called a ridiculous figure, stating that they can put up 5 infantry and 1 mechanized division. And the British proposed this at a time when the Soviet Union declared its readiness to put 136 divisions, 5 thousand medium and heavy guns, up to 10 thousand tanks and wedges, over 5 thousand combat aircraft, to the front against the aggressor. how frivolously the British Government reacted to the negotiations on a military agreement with the USSR.

        The above data is sufficient to confirm the conclusion that suggests itself, and this conclusion is that:

        1. The Soviet Government throughout the negotiations with exceptional patience sought to ensure an agreement with England and France on mutual assistance against the aggressor on an equal footing and provided that mutual assistance would be truly effective, that is, that the conclusion of a political agreement would be accompanied the signing of a military convention establishing the dimensions, forms and terms of assistance, for the entire previous course of events showed quite clearly that only such an agreement could

        to be effective and capable of reasoning with Hitler’s aggressor, spoiled by complete impunity and connivance of the Western powers for many years;

        2. The conduct of England and France in the course of negotiations with the Soviet Union fully confirmed that they were not thinking of any serious agreement with the USSR, for the policies of England and France were guided by other goals that had nothing to do with the interests of peace and the fight against aggression;

        3. The cunning plan of Anglo-French politics was to make Hitler understand that the USSR has no allies, that the USSR is isolated, that Hitler can attack the USSR without risking opposition from England and France.

        In view of this, it is not surprising that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations ended in failure.

        This failure was, of course, not accidental. It became more and more obvious that the breakdown of negotiations was planned in advance by representatives of the Western powers in their double game. The fact is that, along with open negotiations with the USSR, the British conducted backstage negotiations with Germany, and with these latter they attached incomparably greater importance.

        While the ruling circles of the Western powers sought primarily by their negotiations in Moscow to lull the vigilance of the public opinion of their countries, to deceive the peoples involved in the war, the negotiations with the Nazis were of a different nature.

        The program of the Anglo-German negotiations was quite clearly formulated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of England Halifax, who addressed Hitler Germany with unequivocal calls for

        the time when his officials continued to negotiate in Moscow. On June 29, 1939, in a speech at a banquet at the Royal Institute of International Relations, Halifax expressed his readiness to come to an agreement with Germany on all matters that "arouse the world concern." He said: “In such a new atmosphere, we could discuss the colonial problem, the issue of raw materials, trade barriers, the“ living space ”, arms limitation and all other issues affecting Europeans” 1.

        1 “Speeches on the International Politics of Lord Halifax,” Oxford, London 1940, p. 296.

        If we recall how the conservative newspaper Daily Mail, which was close to Halifax, interpreted the problem of “living space” back in 1933, inviting the Nazis to seize “living space” from the USSR, then there is not the slightest doubt about the true meaning of Halifax's statement. This was an open proposal to agree on the division of the world and spheres of influence, addressed to Hitler Germany, a proposal to resolve all issues without the Soviet Union and mainly at the expense of the Soviet Union.

        Back in June 1939, the representatives of England began in strict secrecy with Germany through an authorized Hitler who had arrived in London on the four-year plan of Voltat. Hudson, the English Minister for Overseas Trade, and Chamberlain's closest adviser, G. Wilson, spoke with him. The contents of these June talks are still buried in the cache of diplomatic archives. But in July, Voltat again visited London, and negotiations were resumed. The contents of this second round of negotiations are now known from the German trophy documents at the disposal of the Soviet Government, which will soon be released.

        Hudson and G. Wilson proposed to Voltat, and then to the German ambassador in London, Dirksen, to begin secret negotiations to conclude a broad agreement that would include an agreement on the division of spheres of influence on a global scale and the elimination of "killer competition in common markets." At the same time, it was envisaged that Germany would prevail in south-eastern Europe. Dirksen, in his July 21, 1939 report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicated that the program discussed by Voltat and Wilson covered political, military, and economic situations. Among the political provisions, a special place was given, along with the non-aggression pact, the non-intervention pact, which was supposed to include “the delineation of living spaces between the great powers, especially between England and Germany” 1.

        When discussing issues related to the conclusion of these two pacts, the British representatives promised that if these pacts were signed, England would abandon the guarantees she had just provided to Poland.

        The Danzig question, as well as the question of the Polish corridor, the British were ready, if an Anglo-German agreement was concluded, to provide the Germans with one-on-one settlement with Poland, pledging not to interfere in their resolution.

        Further, and this is also documented by the reports of Dirksen, which will soon be published, Wilson confirmed that in the case of the conclusion of the above pacts between England and Germany 1 Note by the German Ambassador to England Dirksen of July 21, 1939 Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

        English warranty policy will be virtually eliminated.

        “Then Poland,” says Dirksen in his report on this subject, “would be, so to speak, left alone face to face with Germany.”

        All this meant that the rulers of England were ready to give Poland to be torn to pieces by Hitler at the very time when the ink had not yet been dried, by which the English guarantees were signed to Poland.

        At the same time, in the event of the conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement, the goal set by England and France, starting negotiations with the Soviet Union, would be achieved, and the possibility of accelerating the clash between Germany and the USSR would be even more facilitated.

        Finally, the political agreement between England and Germany was supposed to be supplemented by an economic agreement that included a secret deal on colonial issues, on the distribution of raw materials, on the division of markets, as well as on a large English loan for Germany.

        So, the rulers of England were drawn to a tempting picture of a lasting agreement with Germany and the so-called "sewer" of German aggression to the East against Poland, which they had recently "guaranteed" and against the Soviet Union.

        Is it any wonder that the slanderers and falsifiers of history carefully keep silent and try to hide these facts, which are crucial for understanding the situation in which the war thus became inevitable.

        By this time, there could already be no doubt that England and France not only did not intend to seriously take anything in order to prevent Hitlerite Germany from starting a war, but, on the contrary, did everything in their power to make secret arrangements and transactions, using methods of all kinds of provocations to set Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union.

        No counterfeiters will be able to eject either from history or from the consciousness of peoples the decisive fact that under these conditions the choice facing the Soviet Union was this:

        or to accept, for self-defense, the proposal made by Germany to conclude a non-aggression treaty, and thereby ensure the Soviet Union extend the peace for a certain period that could be used by the Soviet state to better prepare its forces to repel a possible attack by the aggressor,

        or reject Germany’s offer of a non-aggression pact and thereby allow provocateurs of war from the camp of the Western powers to immediately drag the Soviet Union into an armed conflict with Germany in a situation completely unfavorable to the Soviet Union, subject to its complete isolation.

        In this situation, the Soviet Government was forced to make its choice and conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany.

        This choice was a far-sighted and wise step of Soviet foreign policy under the circumstances that created then. This step of the Soviet Government to a large extent predetermined the outcome of World War II, favorable for the Soviet Union and for all freedom-loving peoples.

        It would be a gross slander to assert that the conclusion of a pact with the Nazis was part of the USSR foreign policy plan. On the contrary, the USSR all the time sought to have an agreement with Western non-aggressive states against German-Italian aggressors in order to implement collective security on the basis of equality. But agreement is a mutual act. If the USSR sought an agreement to combat aggression, England and France systematically rejected it, preferring to pursue a policy of isolation of the USSR, a policy of concessions to aggressors, a policy of directing aggression to the East, against the USSR. The United States of America not only did not oppose such a pernicious policy, but, on the contrary, strongly supported it. As for the American billionaires, they continued to invest their capital in German heavy industry, helped the Germans expand their military industry and thus armed German aggression, as if saying: “Fight, gentlemen, Europeans, for health, fight with God's help, and we humble American billionaires will profit from your war, killing hundreds of millions of dollars of superprofits. ”

        It is clear that in this situation in Europe, the Soviet Union had only one option: accept the Germans' offer of a pact. It was still the best way out of all possible exits.

        Just as in 1918, due to the hostile policies of the Western powers, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude a Brest peace with the Germans, and now, in 1939, 20 years after the Brest Peace, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude a pact with the Germans in view of the same hostile policy of England and France.

        The talk of all kinds of slanderers that the USSR should not have allowed itself to make a pact with the Germans cannot be considered otherwise than ridiculous. Why Poland, having allies in the person of England

        and France, could have entered into a non-aggression pact with the Germans in 1934, and the Soviet Union, which was in less favorable conditions, could not have entered into such a pact in 1939? Why could England and France, representing the dominant power in Europe, be able to agree to a non-aggression declaration with the Germans in 1938, and the Soviet Union, isolated thanks to the hostile policies of England and France, could not make a pact with the Germans?

        Is it not a fact that of all the non-aggressive big powers of Europe, the Soviet Union was the last power that went on a pact with the Germans?

        Of course, the falsifiers of history and other reactionaries are dissatisfied with the fact that the Soviet Union was able to skillfully use the Soviet-German pact in order to strengthen its defense, that it was able to push its borders far west and block the path of unhindered advance of German aggression to the East, which Hitler the troops had to launch their offensive to the East not from the Narva - Minsk - Kiev line, but from the line that went hundreds of kilometers to the west that the USSR did not bleed in the Patriotic War, but emerged victorious from the war. But this discontent already refers to the field of impotent malice of failed politicians.

        The evil discontent of these gentlemen can only be seen as a demonstration of the undeniable fact that the policy of the Soviet Union was and remains the correct policy.