Rzhev

by Luka Bilić

Rzhev salient was created during Soviet winter Moscow counter offensive and was a direct result of resilience of German 9th Army and its new commander general Walter Model. While on his flanks 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were falling back in dissaray, Model’s command managed to mostly hold its positions deeply jutting into Soviet held territory toward Moscow. This outstanding defensive success helped stabilize front of entire AGC, anchor its defenses and deny Soviets access to vital communication lines and centers at Sychevka and especially Vyazma. Without proper lines for mass transport, modern war offensives (especially Red Army from that period of war) were running on borrowed time and had very limited reach.

After front completely stabilized by late spring 1942 salient not only became of defensive importance but provided very valuable ground for potential new German try aimed at Moscow. Zhukov insisted for salient to be eliminated. First try was in summer with two Fronts but it turned out to be costly failure. Simply Red Army still wasn’t capable of taking Wehrmacht on on equal terms, especially when Germans were well prepared on favorable defensive terrain and led by such class as Model was. Still some changes were looming on the horizon.. For the first time in war Zhukov’s forces managed to achieve a clean breakthrough of German lines held by prepared veteran units. Gap was through full depth of defense line and some 30 km wide, but Red Army still lacked coordination, command and control abilities, combined arms cooperation, transport means and logistical system to rapidly exploit initial succes in depth. Zhukov tried again in late November , coinciding with operation Uranus. This was operation Mars and while some try to mitigate the failure by saying it was only support operation for Stalingrad encirclement, evidence show those were equally important undertakings, though it was clear Uranus had more chance of success since it had weaker opposition, was prepared longer and better, allocated more of key resources like heavy artillery ammunition etc. Once again operation was a costly failure for number of reasons. German qualitative superiority, excellent intelligence on the part of 9th Army that not only identified coming offensive and units involved but even mostly guessed their approaching venues. Such superb intelligence work enabled not only prepared defenses on key sectors but allocation of mighty mobile reserves-4 mobile divisions in immediate reserve and 3 panzer divisions more in AG reserve, available in few days if necessary. All this spelled doom on Soviet attempt even before it started. Yet something was achieved. All of these reserves were completely engaged in Rzhev area and had no way to assist in the south where at Stalingrad German forces were being devastated.

Though German defensive efforts in AGC area were very effective, attrition was serious (around 310 000 casualties since beginning of 1942) and it took 29 divisions to hold this relatively small salient. Thus even Model urged Hitler to abandon the salient. Hitler and high command agreed because they were desperately short of troops badly needed in the critical southern sector of the front and to create reserves. The abandonment of salient would free 22 German divisions including practically all of mobile units, retreat which shortened German lines for 370 km was code named - operation Buffalo.

Retreat was systemic and skillful militarily and even more brutal and pitiless in effect to helpless civilians living in the area. Model convinced Hitler that Soviets wouldn’t profit from liberated land.

Villages fared no better..For example only in Sychevka area 137 villages were burned. Orders included every peace of cattle to be taken, everything of any value taken, every bridge, railway and so on destroyed. Agricultural means were stolen, crops destroyed, and anything unpractical to steal was destroyed( this went so far that even as mondane things as barrels were riddled with bullets to be unusable). Wells with water for people and animals were all poisoned.This ‘retreat’, but actually eufemism for mass murder and devastation became model for further such operations, which urged Red Army to often advance with reckless speed in order not to allow complete destruction of both lives and property in German held areas. What is also significant is that these atrocities were committed practically exclusively by the regular troops, not the SS and would be routinely committed by regulator troops in the future.In the end, Soviet relentless pressure resulted in Germans amassing huge forces(29 divisions including 7 mobile) in salient measuring 120X240 kilometers and caused some serious blood letting Germans could ill afford, though Soviet losses were up to 5 times higher. Catastrophe in the southern part of front was also directly linked to this pressure.However ‘willingly’ and casually this loss of territory may seem to some, nazis lost the territory they clinged to with teeth and nails and soaked with sea of own blood. Nor was this effort unfounded, for now Soviets finally controlled lines of communication which would enable them to strike at heart of territory held by AGC on Smolensk-Minsk axis, denied to them from winter of 1941. Capture of Vyazma on 12th of March 1943 was of critical importance in this sense since it was major transport hub, necessary for any deeper thrusts toward Smolensk and into Belorussia beyond.