MYTH OF PERFECT INVULNERABLE T-34 FAR SUPERIOR TO PITY MISERABLE GERMAN PANZERS

by Дмитрий Шеин

(All this post is brief quote of my "T-34 goes to war" book, interesting men are welcome: https://www.amazon.com/World-Tanks-T-34-Goes-W…/…/B075712LZ9 )

Soviet memoirists like to cite numerous German praises towards Soviet T-34 - just as our hotheaded . Evald fon Kleist described T-34 as "the finest tank in the world". Guderian wrote in his memoirs about "vast superiority" of T-34. General Mellentin concluded "It was the most excellent example of the offensive weapon of Second World War". And so on, the quotes are almost innumerable. For Russian-spoken readers it was very kindly to read such descriptions as well as Soviet reflections of glorious feats of Russian tankers winning the combat over numerous enemies... but in the deepest deep of mind the painful question troubled many of Russian readers: if T-34 were so vast superior to German tanks then why this true Wunder-waffe did not destroy the pity German panzers in shortest time, for instance during 1941 Summer campaign? Why they did not casted ashes of helpless naked German infantry whose miserability was described by Middeldorf in his "Tactics in Russian campaign"? Why Red army equipped with such a perfect smashing but invulnerable weapon did not disperse Wehrmaht immediately but rather retreat until Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov-na-Donu and later until Volga river and Stalingrad? However the answer was pre-cooked for this painful question: the number of brand-new finest tanks for too few so when Red army was abundantly equipped with such a finest weapon it started the victorous continuous way from one victory to another one until the final red banner raised over captured Reichstag. But later during Perestroika the general number of Soviet tanks was manifested, and it suddenly appears that the number of new tanks was not so vanishingly small as well as number of German tanks was not so vast superior. The good old long-sleeping question was raised again and sharped until its finest by revisionists: why numerous finest tanks of the world did not overthrow their not so numerous inferior opponents? Moreover German memoirists just did not mention any sign of T-34 during Border battle. Please take a look on German memoirs for first mention of T-34: Hoth noticed the first appearance of T-34 by first days of July 1941 near Borisov; Guderian wrote that T-34 appeared first time at end of July; Middeldorf wrote about first appearance of T-34 at August 1941; Mellentin at all noticed the first appearance of T-34 at 1941 October and so on.

At this moment I want to break the story and turn to my own post about risks of studying the history by memoirs. There are two possible ways. First of them is the way of glance: immediately start to pile up one interpretation over another. The examples of such a glance are numerous, for instance well-known Mark Solonin who decided by these reasonings that Red army with its might and main tried to evade the participance of combat and scattered dropping their weapons. There are another considerations reasonable at equal degree... And there is another way of righteous researcher: to put aside all the interpretations and start to gain the historical facts - the numerous documents, the countless photo cards and so on. Yeah, it is quite hard. Yeah, it is quite long. Yeah, it is quite expensive. Yeah, it is much more pleasant for one to read one book of three hundreds of pages and to feel himself suddenly the great specialist in history of Great Patriotic War then to study the first ten thousands of sheets of documents, to conclude that "I know only the fact that I do not know anything!" and run to study next fifty thousands of pages of documents...

... but let us return to the T-34 situation. The wall of text in high enough so it's time to look at some pictures. For instance this: http://waralbum.ru/…/aaaruss291.d6e3fpn6ud4w0gsc0kow8cs48.e… . It's a well-known photo of Pz.38(t) of German 7th tank division shot on June 22nd at Alitus. But we are interested not in Pz.38(t) at foreground but rather the burning tank at background. Look at her attentively: 5 roadwheels, sloped front armor with manhole of driver... yeah. It is definitely T-34, and Pz.38(t) of Hoth panzergruppe is marching near it. Well... what did Hoth wrote about first appearance of T-34? Did he mention something about tank battle at Alitus on first day of war? No... why? May be it was just the single T-34 burned by some kind of cheating (or by its own crew) and so inable to appear all her superiority? Let us ask Google pictures: "T-34 Alitus 1941" and the similar topics... wow! We could find the tens of pictures of tens of tanks. Such a number of lost T-34 is confirmed by Soviet combat documents of 5th tank division of 2nd mechanized corps of Red Army. German participants of this battle is noticed the battle also, moreover they wrote that is was the hottest and hardest battle since start of WW2. OK may be this is the single case? May be herr Hoth just has made a forgivable mistake after some years? OK let us look at this neighbour and competitor Guderian who wrote that T-34 appeared first time at end of July. Well... let us take "The soldier reminiscents". We'll find the numerous mentions fo Belorussian town Slonim captured by Guderian's troops. On evening of July 1st three Soviet tanks tried to break through Slonim: 1 KV and 2 T-34. Results of "T-34 Slonim" Google picture query is almost countless ( https://ic.pics.livejournal.com/…/150976/150976_original.jpg for instance), German soldiers like to take a pictures of burnt out Soviet tanks in Slonim. There are numerous cards of Guderian's soldiers (lorries are marked with G letter) looking at damaged or burtn out T-34 in Belorussia. But just as Hoth Guderian did not mention T-34...

I think it is enough to add the examples of clear lie of German generals. T-34 participated the war from it's first day. Let me manifest just four numbers. There were about 900 T-34 near Soviet western border on 1941 June. More than 500 additional tanks were sent to front during June and July. About 150 were on hand at start of August. The total losses for first six weeks of war are 1303 T-34 out of 1843 T-34 lost during all 1941. Hoth, Guderian, Mellentin, Middeldorf and tens other German memoirists did not ever mention about 1500 T-34 of 1941 Summer but suddenly noticed hundreds of them on Autumn. So what exactly changed instantly and dramatically that thousands of "finest tanks" and "most excellent offensive weapon" were not mentioned on Summer but tens to hundreds of T-34 were suddenly noticed on Autumn?

So the next lesson of memoir analysis. When one is analysing the memoir is it quite necessary to understand when, where and for whom the memoir was compiled. In case of German after-war memoirs the situation looks like that: 1. Germany lost the war. The war ended with decisive victory of Allies and denazification. These circumstances forbade the general outline of memoir like "I served with all the great enthusiasm to glorious establishment of my country". The only way was "I was a good soldier and stayed away from the politics at the battlefield". 2. After well-known Fulton speech of Churchill Russians were appointed as bad guys so it was safe to describe in details the glorious feats of memoirist at Eastern front. 3. So at this moment the memoirist faced the great problem: why Russian campaign started with glorious victories, fast advancing marches and countless prisoners but suddenly almost ends near Moscow with great loss? 4. The first and clear answer is the answer that Russia is too large country, the distances are too long, the theater is too wide and Russians are too numerous... but this is way of fool. Yeah, exactly the way of fool since Russia was not less large and long and wide and Russians were not less numerous on Summer but all these things did not interfere the successful advance of German troops. 5. The next usual point is bad and unsuitable Russian climate with long mud period on Autumn and cold winter but this is way of fool too. Yeah, this is also way of fool due to two reasons. First is the fact that wide of Russian wildernesses, Russian mud and Russian frost affect both sides of war in equal degree. Russians did not have wide Autobahn with hard coverage toward each village of three houses which Autobahn they took with them during retreat

It is clear that when German lorry can't move over mud its Russian counterpart can't move over the same mud too. When German schutze can't go more than a dozen kilometers per day due to heavy mud and cold rain it is hard to impress that Russian soldier marching for 30 and 50 kilometers without fatigue, mud and cold rain, he just walking for his own pleasure and entertainment at dry warm weather by hard-covered road

Second reason is the fact that any soldier is suited for the war at his native environment. It is not the great secret of art of war but rather clear basis. So if any German memoirist tell his reader that Russian soldier is well-suited for Russian war while German soldier has no equipment, no warm clother, not enough lorries and so on, the memoirist at this moment tell his reader that he is unable warlord and cannot decide one of the main basic problem of any warlord. Of cause memoirist has no need to degrade himself. 6. So German memoirist was in great need of the very special reason of his loss of 1941 campaign. The reason which did not affect the events on Summer but affects them greatly on Autumn and Winter. The reason which did not affects Russians but affects Germans. So?..

... yeah, the brand-new invulnerable devastating Russian tanks are very good reason.

One had to add here that since no of German memoirist had a combat experience at Eastern front and took a strategical decisions about equipment of troops simultaneously, it was quite safe to blame the HQ and dumb gefreitor that they did not equip the troops with suitable weapon and in the same time to glorify memoirist's own soldiers who win the decisive victories over invulnerable T-34 and KV with their almost bare hands.

But why Soviet generals such as Zhukov repeating German fairy-tales if these fairy-tales are so clear fairy-tales?.. It is no problem. Soviet generals-memoirists faced the same problem as German but in mirror reflection: why the start of war was so dramatic for Soviets? Why Red army appeared unable to stop German advance in a day, or week, or even month but retreat until Moscow? One has to add that Soviet power affects the shape of memoirs of Soviet generals just as denazification affected German memoirs. The political issues declared that, first, CPSU (VKPb) recognized all the dangers of involvement of USSR into WW2 and timely prepared the country and army for war; second, that Soviet people with great enthusiasm and mass heroism participated the war since its first day. So any referrals to weaknesses of ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-supplied Soviet troops were impossible. The same rpoblem cause the same decision so we are seeing at Soviet general's memoirs that it was just too few of devastating invulnerable new tanks and Germans wins the battles due to their numerical superiority but when Soviet troops were supplied abundantly with newest finest tanks they started to win the battles. And just in German case no of Soviet high leaders who took decisions about tank production - Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Malyshev - left memoirs so it is safe to blame the blind HQ which did not equip the memoirist and his troops with suitable weapon in adequate quantities.

... the next wall of text is complete. If one is interested in details do not hesitate to ask in comments.