Lend Lease Trucks

By Andrius Dirmeikis

BY THE TIME LEND-LEASE STARTED TO ARRIVE IN LARGE NUMBERS, THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY TURNED THE TIDE Many people, who are poorly educated about the timeline of lend-lease, have a false notion that lend-lease came at the most crucial time for the Soviets and it prevented the collapse of the USSR. In actuality, if you look at the numbers, it becomes clear that most of the lend-lease deliveries arrived after 1943, meaning that in the most crucial battles the Soviets fought largely on their own supplies. Only 13% of lend-lease supplies arrived in 1941-42. For example, out of nearly 380,000 trucks that the Soviets had in early 1943, only 5% were imported lend-lease trucks. Imported firepower, mainly aircraft and tanks, was prominent in the first trickle of aid in 1941-42. Meanwhile, 64% of lend-lease supplies arrived in 1944-45. If year 1943 is included as well, than 87% of all lend-lease supplies arrived in 1943-1945. And if year 1943 is analyzed separately as well, than it becomes clear that over 60% of the supplies arrived in the second half of the year, largely in the fourth quarter. By the time lend-lease started to arrive in large numbers in late 1943, the Germans had already suffered three huge defeats on the Eastern Front- at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. The strategic offensive capacity of the Wehrmacht had in practice been eliminated. With the turn in the war's tide, a new phase was under way which determined the character of Soviet victory and German defeat. From late 1943 onwards, it was motor vehicles, high-grade fuels, communications equipment, industrial machinery and processed foodstuffs that were predominant in lend-lease supplies. All these supplies, delivered from late 1943, had helped to speed up the process of German defeat, which otherwise would've been more longer and costly. For example, if only 5% of all Soviet trucks in early 1943 were imported, this number grew to a total of 33% by May 1945. David Glantz, a famous U.S. military historian, who specializes on the Eastern Front and the Red Army in particular, had the following to say about the lend-lease: "Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941-1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic raw materials necessary for Soviet victory. Without Lend-Lease, the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches."