(I)Typhoon-origins, aims and feasibility
by Luka Bilić
Operation Barbarossa’s aim were many things. Acquiring living space in the east, destruction of Soviet state and ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ decay, permanent state of serfdom for its people, destruction of Russian cultural heritage, obtaining of resources for protracted war with Anglo American powers, securing only potential threat to nazi dominated Europe, isolation of Britain and so on. But above all else its goal was decisive and rapid defeat of the Red Army and collapse of Soviet state. It’s goal wasn’t to impress the world with booming performance in border battles or to get as advantageous position in early months for subsequent protracted war, its only goal and its essence was to defeat the Soviets in 1941.Germans were aware of implications of long war of attrition and knew that they had only one shot at this enemy. That’s what Barbarossa was about. Anything else wouldn’t had been considered success at all. One doesn’t go into fight with stronger opponent, that’s almost impossible to defeat in protracted fight (especially if one makes it fight to the death) to impress everybody with his stylish sucker punch opening move unless he believes this move will be the entire fight.Yet Barbarossa despite all its stellar and unprecedented summer successes failed to fulfill its raison d’etre and was also very far from set geographical objectives which by itself still do not fulfill its purpose. Barbarossa was dead, and a shortfall by huge margin. Soviet forces before Dnepr-Dvina line were destroyed as planned but to great disappointment of German wishful expectations Red Army was still in the field resisting all across the front.Alternative expected solution of the problem- collapse of Soviet state was also nowhere in sight.Now German command came up with surrogate solution- operation Typhoon. It had to rectify all the shortfalls of Barbarossa with critically low oil reserves, with armored forces at only fraction of their former strength and capacity to project power further east beyond the point that was recognised as deal breaking one in pre war calculations. But yet again as in Barbarossa hopes were primarily put to expected collapse of Soviet state rather in actual military feasibility of their plans especially if everything wouldn’t go their way.As we know Typhoon wasn’t just a complete failure of its goals but as such lead to reversal and decisive defeat of German arms. After the war, of course rationalizations and embellishments began in famous memoirs. Operation was a huge success, look at the pows taken at Vyazma, look how close we came to Moscow. But neither of these were goals of Typhoon and were huge distance from fulfilling its purpose. Then it continues, it was all because the unexpected rains and even more unexpected winter. If there was no rain and winter, we would have prevailed. Not only that this line of reasoning isn’t serious and is bordering comical and bizarre, it simply wasn’t no where near factual.Today first rate historians connect the failure of Typhoon to three reasons: Soviet resistance and resilience, German outright amateurish planning and the elements. In that very oder, certainly not the other way around which was favorite narrative of defeated German generals that found way into mainstream during the Cold War specific circumstances.I agree with this order- Soviets, Germans, weather, and will analyze each in turn but with main focus on what were Germans actually still capable for.
Operation Barbarossa’s aim were many things. Acquiring living space in the east, destruction of Soviet state and ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ decay, permanent state of serfdom for its people, destruction of Russian cultural heritage, obtaining of resources for protracted war with Anglo American powers, securing only potential threat to nazi dominated Europe, isolation of Britain and so on. But above all else its goal was decisive and rapid defeat of the Red Army and collapse of Soviet state. It’s goal wasn’t to impress the world with booming performance in border battles or to get as advantageous position in early months for subsequent protracted war, its only goal and its essence was to defeat the Soviets in 1941.Germans were aware of implications of long war of attrition and knew that they had only one shot at this enemy. That’s what Barbarossa was about. Anything else wouldn’t had been considered success at all. One doesn’t go into fight with stronger opponent, that’s almost impossible to defeat in protracted fight (especially if one makes it fight to the death) to impress everybody with his stylish sucker punch opening move unless he believes this move will be the entire fight.Yet Barbarossa despite all its stellar and unprecedented summer successes failed to fulfill its raison d’etre and was also very far from set geographical objectives which by itself still do not fulfill its purpose. Barbarossa was dead, and a shortfall by huge margin. Soviet forces before Dnepr-Dvina line were destroyed as planned but to great disappointment of German wishful expectations Red Army was still in the field resisting all across the front.Alternative expected solution of the problem- collapse of Soviet state was also nowhere in sight.Now German command came up with surrogate solution- operation Typhoon. It had to rectify all the shortfalls of Barbarossa with critically low oil reserves, with armored forces at only fraction of their former strength and capacity to project power further east beyond the point that was recognised as deal breaking one in pre war calculations. But yet again as in Barbarossa hopes were primarily put to expected collapse of Soviet state rather in actual military feasibility of their plans especially if everything wouldn’t go their way.As we know Typhoon wasn’t just a complete failure of its goals but as such lead to reversal and decisive defeat of German arms. After the war, of course rationalizations and embellishments began in famous memoirs. Operation was a huge success, look at the pows taken at Vyazma, look how close we came to Moscow. But neither of these were goals of Typhoon and were huge distance from fulfilling its purpose. Then it continues, it was all because the unexpected rains and even more unexpected winter. If there was no rain and winter, we would have prevailed. Not only that this line of reasoning isn’t serious and is bordering comical and bizarre, it simply wasn’t no where near factual.Today first rate historians connect the failure of Typhoon to three reasons: Soviet resistance and resilience, German outright amateurish planning and the elements. In that very oder, certainly not the other way around which was favorite narrative of defeated German generals that found way into mainstream during the Cold War specific circumstances.I agree with this order- Soviets, Germans, weather, and will analyze each in turn but with main focus on what were Germans actually still capable for.
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