(II) Typhoon- origins, aims and feasibility

by Luka Bilić

Today first rate historians connect the failure of Typhoon to three reasons: Soviet resistance and resilience, German outright amateurish planning and the elements.

1. Soviet resistance. This is without doubt the basic cause of failure of German plans in the east. Soviet armies of first and second strategic defensive echelon (border regions and area closely beyond DD (Dnepr-Dvina) line at Luga, Smolensk,Kiev) were relatively easily destroyed (though those on the borders with uncomparably less trouble than the letter) in unequal struggle, sucker punched by nazi army. Yet this came with a price as resistance was much more stubborn and fierce than expected, resulting in shattering of German schedule and serious blood letting of the Wehrmacht which it could hardly afford. German growing logistical troubles derived from miserable planning but as well from Soviet sabotage of lines of communications, various installations, partisan activity and so on. Paramountly Soviet morale didn’t crack, people, army and the leadership, none lost their nerve. This is definitely among top grade reasons of German failure, as it was considered one of most probable and realistic paths to their ultimate success. Even German population fed with official propaganda and nazi racist and underestimating worldview recognized and respected this small miracle. As SD noted in September 1941 in the report on mood and reasoning on German home front: ‘..many Germans now believed the Soviet people were fighting out of their own profound belief in communism and not just fear of commissar's pistol.’ For me this is huge, that as early as September 1941 Germans saw through their official propaganda and realized that Soviets weren’t fighting because they were forced to. They sensed they were fighting ‘for something’, but of course their reasoning that they were mainly fighting for ‘communism’ was naive and conditioned by false dichotomy nazi paradigm presented them with. Of course much evidence points to widespread support for Soviet war effort , with a passion beyond simple adherence to Soviet state or Stalin.(as Broekmeyer, Bordiugov, Thurston,Bonwetsch, Gorinov and others point out in their works). For me Alexander Werth, a British BBC correspondent stationed in SU and allowed to travel around the country (even alone) summed very nicely the essence of things after the war: ‘In the fearful days of 1941/42 and in the next two and a half years of costly victories, i never lost the feeling that this was genuine People’s War; first a war waged by a people fighting for their life against terrible odds, and later a war fought by fundamentally unaggressive people, now roused to anger and determined to demonstrate their own military superiority.’

Still probably the most crucial among important Soviet achievements was their force generation capacity that was unprecedented in human history. Completely surreal 400 new divisions were formed in second half of 1941. 157 divisions were formed in June/July alone, these divisions were hastily committed after only 1-2 months of training to plug gaps in line after destruction of the armies of first strategic defensive echelon. It was also these (June-July first wave ) divisions that Germans were fighting and engulfing at Vyazma -Bryansk in October. So while Germans were fighting in western Ukraine and Belorussia Soviets were already creating armies to defend not only Smolensk, central Ukraine etc but already building defences of Moscow behind them. Short to hundred divisions equivalent were created in August and some 85 divisions equivalent in September-October period. This was second wave of force generation. Therefore while Germans were fighting attrition battles in August over entire AGC front, on Luga line and on Dnepr line in Ukraine, vast armies were being raised in the background that would be employed in Moscow counter offensive! And while part of these forces had to be employed prematurely again to control German advance into Ukraine after Kiev disaster and to bolster Moscow defences after Vyazma Bryansk defeats, most of them were harbored for some 4 months before being unleashed upon overextended, exhausted and unsuspecting German armies before Moscow. Germans were surprised beyond their dreams that right after Kiev sized cataclysm new Soviet front was appearing in eastern Ukraine. Same happened at Moscow, just enough reinforcements were fed to stop German advance and the rest was held back until Zhukov assessed time had come to hit back. But had there been a need they could’ve been committed earlier to prevent any German attempt to take Moscow. Nor did the torrent end there, in December 113 divisions equivalent were created and the flurry continued into next year unabated, with huge rise in industrial production.

Likewise Soviet resistance in front of Moscow was just as formidable and more. To begin with, encircled hapless forces at Vyazma Bryansk refused to give up and in valiant unequal battle held up bulk of German forces for 3 weeks before they could continue to Moscow. Germans paid the price for their destruction and also many soldiers escaped to the east. In the following phase Red Army gave even better account of itself and fiercely contested German advance every step of the way. Defence of Tula and Volokolamsk highway or battle for Mozhaisk and Kalinin are well known as well as for Germans ominous signs of maturation in mechanized warfare when for example Katukov’s armor badly mauled entire 4th Pz division and rendered it inoperable for some time.