Bagration

by Luka Bilić

Controversies and analysis of intelligence, strategy and outcome

Every interesting eastern front operations is full of controversies and Bagration is no exception. These mostly fall into categories of inadequate and/or ignored intelligence; faulty strategy of defense and responsibility for the above mentioned.

Intelligence . It is often said that intelligence reports about comming offensive were ignored by the high command and that catastrophe was thus largely preventable.

In reality Soviet maskirovka (concept of deception, operational security, counter intelligence, camouflage etc) was highly efficient and sophisticated. It was at work on virtually every level. Reinforcements to the Belorussian sector were huge, but yet remained obscured. Only in last six weeks prior to offensive Soviets moved in 56 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry corps, 10 tank corps, 2 mechanised corps, one tank brigade, 18 tank regiments, 31 assault gun regiments and huge numbers of other units like artillery, AA, AT and others. In those last six weeks 2800 trains (127 000 freight wagons) were used to bring 5.7 million tons of supplies (for comparison this is 1/3 of total land lease weight delivered over 4 years). Additional 2200 trains were used over last 10 weeks to bring in reinforcing units themselves. All in all during those last 10 weeks gigantic 7000 train compositions (around 315 000 fraight wagons) moved troops and material into the area. These trains were moved mainly during night time, with daylight traffic in opposite direction to create illusion that trooos were in reality being moved to reinforce some other sectors. Only half of rail capacity of inbound lines was used which slowed the build up drastically but didn’t alert the enemy. Train schedules were manipulated and offical announcements were forged to deceive the enemy. Needless to say this was very complicated task that produced lots of friction and further delays. Reinforcing units themselves after being extracted from their previous positions of front wouldn’t be moved directly to Belorussian sector but would go to deep rear, where German intelligence would lose track of them and would be deployed forward as late as possible in strictest secrecy. They would be unloaded some 100 km away from the front and would march by night to their positions at least 50 km from the front. Some 5-7 days before the offensive they closed in to some 12-20 km and to the front itself only one or two nights before the attack. All of this movement was strictly rationalized, for example, all day time traffic was forbidden except for vehicles with special permit. Entire field army would only get 100 such permits. Once in position units didn’t leave forests and friendly planes were scouting the area trying to spot concealed units, which would then be immediately informed of this in order to improve camouflage until it was impregnable. Deception was also important part of operation. Every effort was made to convince the enemy that attack will come in other sector(s). This was done with dummy troop concentrations, false and intense radio traffic in those areas, while in actuall attack sector radio traffic was strictly disciplined. Soviet air force activity, reconnaissance efforts etc all indicated to attack in other sectors( northern Ukraine and Romania above all), while scouting in real sector was minimized and even artillery range finding was cut to few shots maximum. Better look into all this with reconnaissance airplanes was prevented by dominant Red Air Force but periodically reconnaissance flights were allowed into sectors where deceptive activities were taking place. Meanwhile in Belorussian sector, massive fortified areas were being constructed to convince Germans of its defensive posture. Main indicators of Soviet operational intentions however was positioning of their main instruments of offensive actions and deep exploitations- tank armies. Soviets were aware that German intelligence was investing huge efforts to track them, so they left all of them (except the 5th) in the areas of feigned (better to say subsequent but not immediate) offensives. Even departure of 5th Guards Tank Army from Romania was done in such secrecy (while its HQ remained in Romania with radio traffic suggesting normal situation) that when offensive began German intelligence still placed it in Romania.

The secret of huge undetected armored reinforcements to Belorussia was simple but brilliant. In stead of bringing in large number of new units that could be picked by enemy intelligence, existing units were rather reinforced either with troops and material or with small new units. So instead of tank armies, torrent of tank regiments and brigades came. Tank armies in their role of deep exploitation were replaced by much less conspicuous two Cavalry Mechanised Groups, powerful formations that nearly had a strength of a tank army but were more mobile in marshy and foresty terrain of Belorussia, better suited to off road movements and forcing of numerous water obstacles. Also these units weren’t part of any official table of organization but rather unofficial grouping of units, which also greatly aggravated their identification. Plans for the offensive and circulation of orders was limited to put it mildly. For ilustration, even Army commanders received their orders on June 20, two days before the offensive.

The results were rewarding. Local German intelligence did notice during June preparations for offensive and build up of Soviet units, for to obscure it completely a magican would be needed not mere superb staff work. But the trick was, how much did they know? It was obvious that Soviets would launch multiple offensives and only those sectors with most comprehensive and convincing intelligence would get scarce reinforcements, torn between various sectors of eastern front and from recently launched ‘second front’ in France. While AGC intelligence advised that coming offensive wouldn’t be merely a diversion, they made crutial misses in their identifications and reports. Entire 5th Guards Tank Army was missed and still placed on 22nd June in Romania, 2nd Guards Army and 51st Army were completely missed as well (believed to still be at Crimea). 28th Army and 6th Guards Army arrival to the area were missed as well. Only three of ten tank corps were identified, while overall assessment of Soviet armor was sadly poor- out of 5000 tank and assault guns ready to tear AGC to pieces only 400-1100 were believed to be present by intelligence reports.

Therefore while Hitler’s tendency to diminish intelligence reports and threats was well known and at the time other developments were also distracting high command’s attention(Normandy), it is obvious from the above that even local intelligence missed the most indicative part- build of of armored forces and elite units. Without strong mechanised offensive arm, it was believed that strongly fortified defenses of Belorussian balcony would hold at least long enough for reinforcements to arrive or for troops to evacuate, as they controlled all the good roads. While reserves were made ready to other, for enemy offensive snd success ‘more promising’ sectors.