Bagration Demonstration of Red Army maturation and comparison of Barbarossa and Bagration

by Luka Bilić

Operation Bagration was the biggest allied operation of WW2, most devastating defeat of the war for the Germans and one of finest examples of how modern combined arms, mechanised, mobile operations should be executed. From strategic and tactical planning to sophisticated deception campaign, covert concentration of forces to coordination, command and control, inter arms coordination, engineer and logistical wonders to adept and aggressive leadership and skill of ordinary troops.

These characteristics are usually associated to the Germans, but by 1944 the Red Army closed the quality gap with the vaunted Wehrmacht. Bagration was an example of what Red Army was capable of if planning was done professionally without political pressure, if time was allowed for thorough, time consuming maskirovka campaign and so on. In Bagration Soviet permanent losses were smaller than German ones and this ratio was especially favorable in the first two weeks before Soviet lines of supply were extended and large fresh forces brought in by the Germans.Often it is objected that the Red Army never really learned how to fight, rather relying on mass, and big losses from late war period are given as proof. I say Bagration wasn’t luck, it was the proof of what they could do. But the thing is, after disasters in Belorussia, Normandy and conspiracy against Hitler, Soviet political leadership was afraid that Germans would collapse with Red Army still mostly on Soviet territory. This would mean restoration of Poland that is hostile to SU, strong(er) Germany that they wanted to allow, no buffer territories against future invasions, no fulfillment of age long Russian ambitions on the Balkans and so on. 28 million of Soviet dead would’ve been for very little gain, for mere survival. So political pressure was great in late stages of war to press west with haste and control as much territory as possible before peace came. Because of this military operations were often conducted without enough planning, without time for careful maskirovka (deception, operational security), and even the tactical conduct of operations was often under political pressure, urging for speed, enticing rivalry among commanders and so on. Without this influence it would be clear that there was no quality gap left between the two armies.

Operation Bagration resembled Barbarossa in reverse, at least in that central part of the theater. First phase was especially impressive, in mere week Red Army smashed through powerful defences, advanced hundreds of kilometers and inflicted 200 000 permanent casualties(Ziemke, Erickson) to the Wehrmacht! Not only manpower losses were suffered by the Germans, but huge loss of equipment aswell, as entire divisions were destroyed, which also meant unrecoverable loss of accumulated experience, traditions and know how of those units. In first nine days of offensive (June), twenty five divisions were destroyed, while in July another 28.

I find comparison of circumstances, conditions and results of Barbarossa and Bagration very intriguing.

-To start with, first phase of Bagration (11 days of so called Minsk offensive) roughly correlates to initial German gains during Barbarossa, in depth of advance, time frame and in the manner it was done. Following phase of Bagration saw slowing of Soviet advance and ‘Blitzkrieg’ style of advance started more to resemble war of attrition(with dominance and initiative still firmly in Soviet hands) due to extending lines of communications, loss of surprise and large German reinforcements. This could be compared to battle of Smolensk when German advance slowed considerably due to similar reasons and some esteemed authors claim, war of attrition bagan in the east(most visible in large scale static defensive battles of AGC east of Smolensk throughout rest of summer).

-Considering factor of surprise and secret concentration of forces, a crucial prerequisite of ‘Blitzkrieg’, in 1941 Germans weren’t even at war with Soviets, more so had no-aggression treaty and ongoing war with British Empire. In such circumstances Germans didn’t need to best Soviet intelligence and military professionals, for them it was enough to convince other side on political level, which was incomparably easier, not least because Stalin wanted to avoid war at all cost at the time and hoped that ongoing war in the west would maybe deter them..

Soviets in 1944 had immensely more difficult job. War was raging for years, all senses were savagely sharp.. They had to best German military intelligence, army reconnaissance forces and so on, which they did exemplary.-In 1941 Red Army was in abysmal state, from very low battle readiness to peace time level of mobilization, unserviceable equipment, catastrophic command and control capabilities and so on. On top of that army was poorly trained and officers corps degradated in purges. Front was only partially possessed, thinly held, with no depth, easily pierced at will by the Germans.

In 1944 German Wehrmacht of AGC was battle hardened and experienced army with no debilitating inadequacies Red Army had in 1941. Their front was heavily fortified in depth and battle readiness at moment’s notice.

-Deployment of the Red Army in 1941 was mistakenly set too far forward in accordance with misleading concept of taking the fight to enemy soil once attacked. Operationally this only exposed armies to envelopment as they had no chance to seize initiative and counter attack successfully.

In 1944, Germans in Belorussia were actually in similar position in a sense that defenses of the bulge were based on holding forward positions centered on communication centers and good roads and relying on terrain features. There was lack of forces for true and ubiquitous deep, echeloned defense.