Bagration Controversies and analysis of intelligence, strategy and outcome Strategy

by Luka Bilić

For the summer of 1944 STAVKA was planning multiple offensives and Germans were trying to guess exactly when and where these would materialize. Soviet advance during winter of 1943/44 (great Dnepr- Carpatian offensive) brought them into Romania in the south, to the Carpathian foothills in the center and into the prewar Poland, just south of Prypiat marshes around Kovel area. To the north ‘Belorussian balcony’ jutted east all the way to Russian border, less than 300 miles from Moscow. Two significant strategic realities presented themselves consequently. First, vital Romanian oil fields were within striking distance (a fortnight infantry’s march) and second, advance to Kovel area in Poland finally took the Red Army beyond the Prypiat marshes which were left to their north east opening possibility to cut into the rear of army groups Center and North by driving north toward Baltic and possibly encircling those units with simultaneous offensive from the north shoulder of Belorussian balcony.(map)

Germans considered these two possibilities as most likely and Soviet deception only reinforced allready existing beliefs. STAVKA however learned its lessons in the past, not to try and destroy the Germans in one blow as they proved to be too resilient and such attempts routinely backfired ultimately. (strategy of more limited and careful offensives was adopted as official one after thousand km advance of the Red Army in 1942/43 winter was painfully stopped by Manstein’s ‘backhand blow’). They were worried about feasibility of such huge simultaneous offensives (map) and exposed flank of especially southern thrust during such undertaking.Thus unexpected and brilliant solution was adopted to attack the face, rather than shoulders of Belorussian balcony. This was unexpected move, more so because terrain was marshy and foresty, unsuitable for large mechanised operations, with few good roads that were super heavily defended.

German local strategy for defence of Belorussia heavily relied to the terrain factor. Prypiat marshes were deemed impassable all together while other parts of the bulge were considered unsuited to mechanised warfare due to lack of roads, dense primordial forests intersected with innumerable rivers and marshlands. Four principal good roads led into the balcony (from north to south- at Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruysk) but these lines of communication and area around them were turned to mighty fortresses defended in depth (three zones each with three defense lines spanning for some 30-40 km in depth) occupied with experienced units at full strength. Weakness was relatively weak possession of bad terrain sectors between the fortified areas and lack of reserves, especially armored (only one panzer divisions in reserves of entire AGC). But these same weaknesses were present before and yet Soviet offensives in that sector of previous winter were all defeated because main communications were defended tenaciously and terrain prevented sustainable thrusts in other sectors.

This time it was not to be. Red Army displayed amazing capability of sustaining mechanised thrusts and supplying them through virtually impassable terrain of Belorussian swamps. Troops and mobile forces in particular practiced for months coordination with engineers and learned their skills in obstacles overcoming. Soviet pontoon units and equipment was of highest standard, considerably better than German ones. Engineers could erect 60 tons pontoons spanning 160m in just 3 hours or 50 tons 620 m long bridge in just 3-4 hours from its kits. Next, wooden log roads were rapidly built through the wet lands to enable supply of advancing units. American 4x4 trucks also helped significantly to sustain the offensive. Finally engineers repaired bridges and railways with fantastic speed, enabling supplies to be brought forward for following stages of offensive.

The main controversy here was resentment of Hitler’s Festerplatz(fortress city) orders and belated withdrawal orders by the local commanders. In post war narrative it was said that elastic defense could perhaps prevented defeat of army group if not loss of territory. The logic behind this reasoning is clear- military basics dictate withdrawal once position is outflanked to prevent attack from rear or encirclement, but this was unorthodox situation in many aspects. There was a consensus prior to the offensive that defense of entire Belorussia depended on denying Soviets access to four main venues of communication. Hitler and high command actually acted in accordance with these accepted principles and believed that Soviet thrusts on the flanks through wetlands and forests couldn’t be of long breath because of impossibility to logistically sustain such thrusts and as long as main roads are held, offensive was limited in its reach and pace. It is really hard to say which approach would be better and since Hitler’s way led to disaster it is always tempting to say with hindsight that alternative way would had been better(especially if this antagonizes Hitler in post war circumstances). There is though IMO at least some logic in holding to roads and fortifications protecting them. Fortifications (built with great effort) were deep and mighty and presented one of rare German advantages in Belorussian campaign. Abandoning them and giving Soviet mobile forces acces to good roads immediately after these fortified positions were flanked could potentially led to even greater calamity as those retreating units couldn’t had hoped even to slow Soviet onslaught without prepared positions. In reality Soviets were forced by stubborn defense of fortified zones at Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobriusk to use forest paths, swamps and dirt roads as main venue of advance for the first and crucial part of the offensive, which Germans didn’t believe they were capable of, at least as sustainable effort (because they themselves couldn’t had done it). Soviet extraordinary capabilities for off road (worst terrain) sustainment of major operations undermined German basic presumptions upon which they built their strategy even before the battle began.

Anyway these tactical deliberations are pretty moot in sense that end result could be changed. Crucial moment here is that Soviets managed to prepare for biggest allied operation in entire war almost undetected and achieve crushing 10 to one superiority in armor overall and same superiority in manpower on key sectors. Such advantage in manpower, mobility and firepower simply wasn’t compensatable.