Attempts to isolate the USSR instead of fighting German aggression

        The further development of events showed even more clearly that the ruling circles of England and France, with their concessions and indulgences to the fascist states, united in 1936 in the military-political bloc, known as the Berlin-Rome Axis, only encouraged and pushed Germany onto the path of conquests.

        Rejecting the policy of collective security, England and France moved to the position of the so-called non-intervention, which JV Stalin spoke of:

        “... the policy of non-interference could be described as follows:“ let each country defend itself from aggressors as it wants and how it can, our business is on the side, we will trade with both aggressors and their victims. ” In reality, however, the policy of non-interference means connivance of aggression, the outbreak of war, and therefore its transformation into a world war ”1.

        Shorthand Records of the 18th Congress of the CPSU (B.), OGIZ, 1939, p. 13

        At the same time, JV Stalin pointed out that "... a big and dangerous political game, begun by the supporters of the policy of non-interference, could end in a serious failure for them." 1

        1 Shorthand Records of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (B.), OGIZ, 1939, p. 14

        Already in 1937 it was perfectly clear that this was a big war being fought by Hitler with the direct “connivance of Great Britain and France?”

        The documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs captured by the Soviet troops after the defeat of Germany reveal the true essence of the foreign policy of Great Britain and France of that period. As can be seen from the documents, the essence of Anglo-French politics did not consist in uniting the forces of peace-loving states for a joint struggle against aggression, but in isolating the USSR and directing Hitler aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union, using Hitler as an instrument for its own purposes.

        At the same time, the rulers of England and France were well aware of the main direction of Hitler's foreign policy, which was defined by Hitler as follows: “We, National Socialists, deliberately draw a line under the direction of our foreign policy in the pre-war era. We begin with what we stopped six centuries ago. We suspend the eternal desire of the Germans to the south and west of Europe and turn our eyes to the lands in the east. Finally, we break with the colonial and trade policies of the pre-war era and move on to the territorial policy of the future. But when (we are now in Europe talking about new lands, then we can primarily think only about Russia and its border countries. It seems that fate itself shows us the way ”2.

        2 A. Hitler, Main Kampf, Munich 1936, p. 742.

        Until recently, it was generally accepted that all responsibility for the Munich betrayal policy rests with the ruling circles of England and France, and with the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier. The fact that the U.S. Government took over the publication of German archival materials, while excluding documents related to the Munich Agreement from the collection, testifies to the U.S. Government's interest in whitewashing the heroes of Munich's betrayal and at the same time trying to blame the USSR.

        The main meaning of the Munich policy of England and France was quite clear already before. The documents in the hands of the Soviet Government from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, provide numerous additional facts that reveal the real meaning of the diplomacy of the Western powers in the pre-war period, showing how the game was played by the destinies of peoples, how shamelessly they traded foreign territories, how the world map was secretly redrawn, how Hitler aggression was encouraged and what efforts were made to direct this aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.

        This is eloquently echoed, for example, by a German document recording a conversation between Hitler and the British Minister Halifax in the presence of the German Foreign Minister von Neurat, which took place in Obersalzberg on November 19, 1937.

        Halifax stated that “he (Lord Halifax) and other members of the English Government are conscious that the Führer achieved much not only in Germany itself, but that, as a result of the destruction of communism in his country, he blocked the latter’s path to Western Europe, and therefore Germany it can rightfully be considered a bastion of the West against Bolshevism ”1.

        1 “Recording of a conversation between the Führer and the Reich Chancellor and Lord Halifax in the presence of Mr. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ober-Salzberg affairs 19. XI 1937”, from the Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

        On behalf of the English Prime Minister Chamberlain, Halifax indicated that there was every opportunity to find a solution to even difficult problems if Germany and England could reach an agreement also with France and Italy.

        Halifax said that “there should not be such an impression that the Berlin-Rome axis or the good relations between London and Paris will suffer as a result of German-English rapprochement. After the German-English rapprochement sets the stage, the four great Western European powers2 must together create the basis on which a lasting peace in Europe can be established. In no case should any of the four powers remain outside this cooperation, because otherwise the present unstable situation will not be put to an end ”3.

        2 This refers to the United Kingdom, France, and

        Italy.

        3 See cit. "Recording a conversation."

        Thus, Halifax, on behalf of the English Government, as early as 1937 made a proposal to Hitler on the annexation of England, and at the same time France, to the "axis of Berlin - Rome."

        However, Hitler responded to this proposal with a statement that such an agreement between the four powers seems very easy for him when it comes to goodwill and a kind attitude towards each other, but things will get complicated if Germany is not considered “as a state that no longer bears the moral or material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles. ”

        In response to this, Halifax stated according to the record:

        “The British are realists and, perhaps more than others, are convinced that the mistakes of the Versailles dictate should be corrected. England in the past has always exerted its influence in this realistic sense. He pointed to the role of England in the early evacuation of the Rhine region, in resolving the reparation issue, as well as in the re-occupation of the Rhine region ”1.

        From a further recording of Hitler’s conversation with Halifax, it is clear that the British Government approvingly approached Hitler’s plans to “acquire” Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Having discussed with Hitler questions about disarmament and the League of Nations and noting that they need further discussion, Halifax said:

        “All other issues can be characterized in the sense that they relate to changes in the European order, which are likely to happen sooner or later. These issues include Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. England is only interested in the fact that these changes were made through peaceful evolution and that methods that could cause further upheaval that neither the Fuhrer nor other countries would want to be avoided. ”2

        1 "Recording a conversation."

        2 Ibid.

        As you can see, this conversation was not a simple probe, the palpation of the interlocutor, which is sometimes caused by political necessity, but a conspiracy, a secret agreement between the British Government and Hitler on satisfying the latter's predatory appetites at the expense of third countries.

        In this regard, it should be noted the statement in Parliament by the British Minister Simon on February 21, 1938, that Britain never gave special guarantees for the independence of Austria. This was a deliberate lie, for such guarantees were given by the Treaty of Versailles and Saint Germain.

        Then the British Prime Minister Chamberlain said that Austria can not count on any protection from the League of Nations.

        “We should not try,” Chamberlain said, “to mislead ourselves, and moreover we should not deceive small, weak nations with hopes that they will receive protection against aggression from the League of Nations, and that we can act accordingly, as we know that nothing like this can be undertaken. ”1

        So the leaders of British politics encouraged Hitler to aggressive actions.

        In the German archive seized by Soviet troops in Berlin, there is also a recording of a conversation between Hitler and the British ambassador in Germany Henderson, which took place in the presence of Ribbentrop on March 3, 1938.2

        1 The Times, February 23, 1938, p. 8.

        2 “Note on a conversation between the Führer (and the Reich Chancellor) and Brit, the royal ambassador, which took place in the presence of Mr. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop on March 3, 1938 in Berlin,” from the Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

        From the very beginning of this conversation, Henderson emphasized its confidential character, stipulating that the contents of the conversation would not be communicated to either the French, Belgians, Portuguese or Italians, who would only be told that the conversation took place as a continuation of the talks between Halifax and Hitler and was devoted to issues concerning Germany and England.

        Speaking in this conversation on behalf of the English Government, Henderson emphasized that

        “It is not a trade deal, but an attempt to establish the basis for true and cordial friendship with Germany, starting from improving the situation and ending with the creation of a new spirit of friendly understanding.” 1

        Not opposing Hitler’s demand for “a Europe without Russia”, Henderson recalled that Halifax, who had by then become the foreign minister, had already agreed with the territorial changes that Germany intended to make in Europe, and that “the purpose of the English proposal is to participate in such a reasonable settlement. ”

        In the same conversation, Henderson, as indicated on the record, said that Chamberlain "showed great courage when, not paying attention to anything, he tore the mask from such international phrases as collective security, etc. ..."

        “... Therefore,” Henderson added, “England declares its readiness to eliminate all difficulties and asks Germany whether it is ready to do the same for its part.” 2

        1 "Note on the conversation."

        2 Ibid.

        When Ribbentrop intervened in the conversation, drawing Henderson’s attention to the fact that the English envoy in Vienna made a “dramatic” statement to von Papen about the events in Austria, Henderson hastened to dissociate himself from his colleague’s statement, stating that “often he himself, Neville Henderson , spoke out for the Anschluss. ”

        This was the language of pre-war English diplomacy.

        Following this conspiracy, already on March 12, 1938, Hitler captured Austria, having met no opposition from England and France. At that moment, only the Soviet Union raised its warning voice and again called for a collective defense of the independence of the countries threatened by aggression. As early as March 17, 1938, the Soviet Government sent a note to the powers expressing its readiness “to begin immediately to discuss with other powers in the League of Nations or outside its practical measures” that “would aim to stop the further development of aggression and eliminate the growing danger of a new world massacre” 1 . The response of the British Government to the Soviet note testified to the unwillingness of the English Government to interfere with these plans of Hitler aggression.

        He stated that a conference for the adoption of “concerted action against aggression would not necessarily have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a beneficial effect on the prospects of the European world” 2.

        1 Izvestia of March 18, 1938.

        2 Note by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs OT March 24, 1933.

        The next link in the chain of German aggression and preparation of the war in Europe was the capture of Czechoslovakia by Germany. And this most important step towards the outbreak of war in Europe could be carried out by Hitler only with the direct support of England and France.

        As far back as July 10, 1938, the German ambassador in London, Dirksen, informed Berlin that the British Government “made the search for a compromise with Germany one of the most important points of its program” and that “this government with respect to Germany shows such a maximum of understanding as any either of the possible combinations of English politicians ”1.

        1 “Political report on July 10, 1938, supplement to report A No. 2589 of June 10, p. ", from the Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

        Dirksen wrote that the British Government "approached the understanding of the most essential points of the basic requirements put forward by Germany regarding the removal of the Soviet Union from the decision of the fate of Europe, the removal of the League of Nations in the same sense, the appropriateness of bilateral negotiations and treaties."

        Dirksen also reported to Berlin that the British Government was prepared to make great sacrifices in the name of "satisfying Germany's other just demands."

        Thus, a far-reaching agreement was reached between the British Government and Hitler in foreign policy plans, as Dirksen so expressively reported in his report to Berlin.

        There is no need to remind everyone of the well-known facts that are directly related to the Munich deal. But we must not forget that on September 19, 1938, that is, 4 days after Hitler met with Chamberlain, who flew for this to Hitler’s residence Berchtesgaden, representatives of the British and French Governments demanded that the Czechoslovak Government transfer Germany to the Czechoslovak regions, inhabited mainly by Sudeten Germans . They motivated this by the fact that without this it would be impossible to maintain peace and ensure the vital interests of Czechoslovakia. The Anglo-French patrons of Nazi aggression tried to cover up their betrayal with the promise of an international guarantee of the new borders of the Czechoslovak state as a "contribution to the cause of pacification of Europe."

        On September 20, the Czechoslovak Government responded to Anglo-French proposals. The Czechoslovak Government stated that “the adoption of proposals of this nature would amount to a voluntary and complete mutilation of the state in all directions.” The Czechoslovak Government drew the attention of the English and French Governments to the fact that "the paralysis of Czechoslovakia would have resulted in profound political changes throughout central and southeastern Europe."

        “The balance of power in central Europe and Europe in general,” the Czechoslovak government stated in its reply, “would have been destroyed; this would entail far-reaching consequences for all other states, and especially for France. ” The Czechoslovak Government appealed to the Governments of England and France “with the last call” to reconsider their point of view, emphasizing that it was in the interests of not only Czechoslovakia, but also its friends, in the interests of “the whole cause of peace and the healthy development of Europe.”

        1 Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938, London 1938, ctd 5847, p. 8 - 9 (Correspondence related to Czechoslovakia. September 1938, p. 8 - 9, London).

        Anglo-French rulers remained implacable. The next day, the British Government sent a response note to the Czechoslovak Government with a proposal to take back their response to the initial Anglo-French proposals and to “weigh it in a hurry and seriously” before creating a situation for which the British Government could not take responsibility. In conclusion, the British Government emphasized that it could not believe that the Czechoslovak arbitration project was now acceptable. It cannot believe, it was stated in this English note, that "the German government considers the situation to be such that it could be resolved by arbitration, as the Czechoslovak government proposes."

        In conclusion, an English note menacingly warned the Czechoslovak Government that, in the event the British Council was rejected, the Czechoslovak Government "should have the freedom to take whatever action it considers appropriate for a situation that could be created later."

        The meeting of Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Daladier, held on September 29-30, 1938 in Munich, was the completion of that shameful deal, which had previously been fully agreed between the main participants in the conspiracy against peace. The fate of Czechoslovakia was decided without her participation. Representatives of Czechoslovakia were invited to Munich only so that they dutifully await the results of a conspiracy between the imperialists.

        All the behavior of England and France left no doubt that the unheard-of act of betrayal by the English and French Governments towards the Czechoslovak people and their republic was not at all an accidental episode in the politics of these states, but was the most important link in this policy, pursuing the goal direct Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union.

        The true meaning of the Munich conspiracy was then exposed by I.V. Stalin, who said that "the Germans were given the regions of Czechoslovakia as a price for the obligation to start a war with the Soviet Union"

        The essence of all this policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles during this period was revealed in the following words of I.V. Stalin at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (B.) In March 1939:

        “The policy of non-interference,” said I.V. Stalin, “means connivance at aggression, the outbreak of war, - therefore, its transformation into a world war.” In the policy of non-interference, there is a desire, a desire - not to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty deed, not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, and even better with the Soviet Union, not from preventing, say, Germany from getting caught up in European affairs, getting involved in a war with By the Soviet Union, to let all the participants in the war get bogged down deeply in the mud of the war, to encourage them to do so secretly, to let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear on the scene with fresh forces, to speak, of course, “in the interests of peace ”, and dictate slabevshim belligerents conditions "2.

        1 Shorthand, report of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), OGIZ, 1939, p. 14.

        2 Ibid., P. 13.

        In the democratic circles of different countries, including the United States of America, Great Britain and France, the Munich Agreement was met with indignation and strong condemnation. The relation of these circles to the Munich betrayal of the Anglo-French rulers can be judged by at least such statements as, for example, statements in the Sayers and Kahn book The Secret War Against Soviet Russia published in the USA. Here is what the authors of this book wrote about Munich: “The governments of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, England and France signed the Munich agreement - the dream of the anti-Soviet“ Holy Alliance ”, which the world reaction had cherished since 1918, came true. The agreement left Russia without allies. The Franco-Soviet Pact, the cornerstone of collective security in Europe, was buried. The Czech Sudetenland became part of Nazi Germany. The gates to the east opened wide before the Hitler hordes. ”1

        1 M. Seyere and A. Kahn, The Secret War against Soviet Russia, Boston 1946, pp. 324 - 325.

        Of all the great powers, the Soviet Union alone at all stages of the Czechoslovak tragedy actively defended the independence and national rights of Czechoslovakia. Trying to justify themselves in the eyes of public opinion, the Governments of England and France hypocritically declared that they did not know whether the Soviet Union would fulfill its obligations to Czechoslovakia arising from the agreement on mutual assistance. But they told a deliberate untruth, for the Soviet Government publicly declared its readiness to speak out for Czechoslovakia against Germany in accordance with the terms of this treaty, requiring France to simultaneously defend Czechoslovakia. But France refused to fulfill her duty.

        Despite this, on the eve of the Munich deal, the Soviet Government reiterated that it was in favor of convening an international conference to provide practical assistance to Czechoslovakia and to take practical measures to maintain peace.

        When the seizure of Czechoslovakia became a fact and the governments of the imperialist countries announced their recognition of the accomplished fact one after another, the Soviet Government in its note of March 18 branded the seizure of Czechoslovakia, committed by Nazi Germany with the complicity of England and France, as an act of arbitrariness, violence, aggression. In the same note, the Soviet Government emphasized that the actions of Germany created and increased the threat to global peace, “violated political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of the anxiety that had already been created in Europe and dealt a new blow to the sense of security of peoples”. The case was not limited to giving Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

        The governments of England and France vied in haste to sign broad political agreements with Nazi Germany. September 30, 1938 in Munich was signed by Chamberlain and Hitler, the Anglo-German Declaration, which said:

        “We continued our conversation today and unanimously came to the conclusion that the issue of German-English relations is of paramount importance for both countries and for Europe. We consider the agreement signed last night and the German-English maritime agreement as a symbol of the desire of our two peoples to never wage war against each other again. We are committed to addressing other issues concerning our two countries through consultations and to strive to resolve any disagreements in the future in order to contribute to peace in Europe. ”2

        It was a declaration of mutual non-aggression by England and Germany.

        1 Izvestia of March 20, 1939.

        2 Archive of Foreign Policy and Regional Studies, p. 483 (Archiv fur Aussenpolitik und Landerkunde, September 1938, S. 483).

        On December 6, 1938, the Franco-German Declaration of Bonnet-Ribbentrop was signed, similar to the Anglo-German one. This declaration stated that the German and French Governments unanimously came to the conclusion that peaceful and good-neighborly relations between Germany and France are one of the most essential prerequisites for the consolidation of relations in Europe and the maintenance of universal peace and that both governments will make every effort to ensure that such relations between their countries. The declaration stated that between France and Germany there are no longer any disputed issues of a territorial nature and that the existing border between their countries is final. In conclusion, the declaration stated that both governments firmly decide, without touching their special relations with third powers, to maintain contact with each other on all issues relating to their countries, and to consult among themselves if these issues could lead in their further development to international complications.

        It was a declaration of mutual non-aggression by France and Germany.

        In essence, the conclusion of these agreements meant that both England and France signed non-aggression pacts with Hitler.

        In these agreements with Hitler Germany, the desire of the English and French Governments to avert the threat of Hitler aggression is clearly revealed, considering that the Munich and other similar agreements have already opened the gates for Hitler aggression to the East, towards the Soviet Union.

        Thus, the political conditions necessary for the "unification of Europe without Russia" were created.

        The matter went to the complete isolation of the Soviet Union.