Air aces. Figures and facts.

 The Germans are considered the best aces pilots of World War II, and it is those of the German pilots who fought with us on the Eastern Front and shot down our planes. Moreover, the numbers are breathtaking. If 15 of our best aces shot down from 41 to 62 German aircraft during the war, then 15 German aces - from 203 to 352 Soviet aircraft. I must say that among Soviet historians these figures have always been doubtful ...
Recently I bought a book ... "Encyclopedia of military art. Military pilots. Ases of World War II" ... it was published in Minsk.
Soviet historians have long written that our planes, shot down by German aces, are actually planes at which the Germans just shot. At the time of the shooting they were photographed. And the shots of a photo-machine gun mounted on German fighters recorded the fact of shooting, and not real destruction.Without a doubt, that is precisely why, in the Encyclopedia ... the thought is especially carefully suggested that the Germans could not lie in this matter. It turns out that for every "shot down" plane, the Germans, in addition to photographs taken by a machine gun, were to submit a questionnaire of 21 points. And in paragraph 9, witness confirmation was required that the plane was shot down. Well, can the Germans lie in such conditions?And here it is. The Americans and the British, the enemy’s plane shot down in a group battle, most likely shared, because their aces have fractional results, say 6.5 wins.We have such an airplane recorded separately for all participants in the battle and did not enter the list of personal victories.And among the Germans, he was necessarily given to one of the participants in the battle. German fighters flew in pairs, and it is clear that their mentality already included that today I confirm the downed plane to you, and tomorrow you to me. That is, the Germans should not have had problems with witnesses. The only obstacle against the postscript was to be the pilot's laziness to fill out 21 points of the questionnaire. But they were not lazy. Questionnaires for the downing of Soviet pilots wrote mercilessly.For an example of German hard work, I will quote from the "Encyclopedia ..." to show at the same time its level:“On November 6, 1943, during a 17-minute battle over Lake Ladoga, Rudorffer announced that 13 Soviet aircraft had been hit by him. This was, naturally, one of the greatest successes in fighter aircraft and at the same time one of the most controversial fights. Apologists (m. - Critics? - Yu.M.) Rudorffer points to the fact that there are no documents confirming this success to date. On the other hand, it is not known how Rudorffer got enough ammunition (m. - ammunition? - Yu.M.) and how are these successes confirmed. Ultimately, this case can be confirmed . Nly ground documents about the losses of Soviet air units (if they really exist) (To do this, so it really knocked them - YM).Meanwhile, for this feat of the workaholic, Rudorffer, who had gotten corns from a fountain pen, ended up in the Guinness Book of Records, although another pilot should rightly have been listed there.July 6, 1943 Guard Senior Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets, alone attacking a guarded system of German diving bombers Ju-87, shot down 9 pieces. He did not fill out questionnaires on them when he ran out of ammunition; he was shot by six who covered the bombers, the Messerschmites. And 9 fallen "Junkers" confirmed ground troops. ...

Awards

... The awards may be different, but they definitely have a common goal - they should stimulate exploits. Without this goal, they are simply trinkets and it makes no sense to establish them. To achieve the goal of the awards, their main principle should be implemented - for equal feat. Destroy this principle when rewarding, and the reward will depreciate.

Say, in the USSR, the Order of Lenin was considered the highest award. But since he was given both to the milkmaid who deserved it, and to the regional party secretary on his birthday, the army preferred not to have him and sought to receive a seemingly lower award - the Order of the Battle Red Banner.

The Germans of those years were born military. We can say that they loved the war and, accordingly, they very precisely understood what a reward was and why it was needed. Their main battle award was the Iron Cross of various ranks. First, the Cross was given the second degree, then the first, after which the Knight's Cross was hung on the neck. Then Oak Leaves were added to it, then - Swords and at the end - Diamonds. And, of course, based on the principle of equal exploits for the award, the Crosses gave for approximately equal merits.

But as regards fighter pilots, these equal merits were numerically very different from the front on which the pilot fought. There were three of these fronts. The first is the territory of Germany itself, the occupied countries surrounding it and England, over which aerial battles were also fought. (Western Front). The second is the south of Italy, Greece and North Africa (Southern Front). The third is the USSR (Eastern Front).

Interesting features

In order to earn the Knight's Cross on the Western Front, a German pilot had to win about 40 victories in the air. For example, the holder of all awards, including Diamonds, which had won exclusively on the Western Front until his death, H. Lent (113 victories in total) received the Knight's Cross for 16 downed planes (Polish and English). G. Jabs (50 victories) received the same award for 19 downed French and English aircraft. G. Gollob (152 victories) - for 42 “victories”. F. Müller, who shot down 30 aircraft before May 9, 1945, was awarded the Knight's Cross in July 1944. At the same time, V. Butz (237 victories) received the Knight's Cross for 101 completed questionnaires on the Eastern Front.

No less striking is the numerical difference for higher awards. On the Western Front, H. Lent receives Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for 60 victories, G. Jabs, who shot down 50 planes for the entire war, receives Oak Leaves in March 1944. On the Eastern Front, E. Hartmann (352 victories) receives Oak Leaves only after 200 “downed” planes, V.Novotny (258 victories) - after 190, G. Barkhorn (301 victory) - after 175.

Diamonds for the Knight's Cross on the Western Front receive after 80-100 victories (V. Melders, A. Galland, H. Lent), and on the East - after 250-300 victories (V. Novotny, E. Hartmann).

These bad soviet pilots

Democrats explain this wild and obvious discrepancy gracefully - they say that Soviet pilots were so worse than the English, and their planes were so imperfect that their downing was not much appreciated. But this idea, so understandable to the democrats, should be confirmed by facts. However, no one does this, since the facts speak completely differently.

English and French pilots fought one and a half times more in time than Soviet ones. In addition, until the end of 1941, our pilots did not conduct individual calculations, and the planes shot down in the dump of group battles were not recorded to anyone’s personal account. Therefore, if the English and French pilots were not even better, but at least not much worse than the Soviet, their best fighter pilots would have had much more victories on their personal account than the best Soviet pilots. But the reality is this.

The best English ace - Colonel D. Johnson - completed 515 sorties during the war, but shot down only 38 German aircraft. The best French ace - lieutenant (lieutenant colonel in the British Air Force) P. Klosterman - completed 432 sorties during the war and shot down 33 German aircraft. And Ivan Nikitich Kozhedub, flying exclusively on Soviet aircraft, having completed only 330 sorties since 1943, shot down 62 German planes. In the Royal Air Force of Great Britain, only 3 pilots shot down 32 aircraft or more. And in the Soviet Air Force there are 39. Yes, and where to bring, say A.F. Klubova, who personally shot down 31 aircraft, but in group battles - another 19? Or L. L. Shestakova, who has “only” 29 German planes on his personal account, but 45 in group battles? Even if only a third of these 45 were shot down by him personally, then L.L. Shestakov, who occupies 52nd place in the list of Soviet aces, like a fighter pilot surpasses the best English ace.

And who shoot down?

The Vostochny Front publishing house has published a collection of Soviet Aces by an anonymous author ... But he, through his teeth, is still forced to write, for example, the following: “The battle with the jet Me-262 was not the hardest fight in Kozhedub’s career. More he had to sweat all at the end of the summer of 1944, when a volunteer group of Luftwaffe aces suddenly appeared under the command of Major Vilch (130 downed planes) on the 3rd Baltic Front site, which managed to annoy the enemy so much that they neutralized it into the 14th Air Force introduced squadron of 1 The 76th GUIAP under the command of Kozhedub. Arriving pilots quickly dealt with the Germans and in a few days of combat shot down 12 enemy aircraft at the cost of two La-7s. Kozhedub reportedly personally shot down Vilkh, although who really became the prey of the Soviet ace is not known .

The British and Americans mercilessly bombed Germany, the Germans constantly maneuvered aircraft, trying to cover their cities. According to them, they sometimes left no more than 400 fighters on the Eastern Front. Nevertheless, in the first half of the war, on the Western and Southern fronts, they lost a third of their aircraft, and two-thirds - on the Eastern. Is this because our pilots and planes were worse than English?

The stupidity of such statements is also confirmed by such a fact. At the beginning of the war, the Germans were confronted by the obsolete TB-3, SB, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft R-Zet, converted from a solid-wood passenger plane, I-16 and I-153 fighters and, most importantly, inexperienced pilots. A year later, the Germans were already met by quite modern fighters Yak, La, LaGG, MiG. They bombed their high-speed diving bomber Pe-2 and attack aircraft Il-2. (The German fighter pilots said about the latter that it was like knocking him down like a hedgehog in the ass. The German ace O. Kittel (267 victories) was reassured forever by IL-2).

And the Il-2 attack aircraft and its modification of the Il-10 by the end of the war became not only the most common bombers of the Soviet Air Force, but also the most massive war planes. In theory, the IL-2 was the main target of the German fighters. However, out of every three stormtroopers lost, two were shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery fire and only one accounted for German aces. And those of our attack pilots who made more than 75 sortie flights (for which the title of Hero was supposed) and did not die, as a rule, have on their account up to 6 downed German fighters.

It would seem that, for this reason, it was at the beginning of the war that the German command was to give rewards for a larger number of Soviet aircraft shot down, and by the end - for less, since with the course of the war it became more difficult to shoot down Soviet aircraft. But in fact, the opposite is true! At the beginning of the war, on the Eastern Front, Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross were given to the pilot for 40 downed planes, but already in 1942 - for 100, in 1943 - for 120, and by the end of 1943 - for 190. How is this to be understood?

Bermuda Triangle

It is also interesting to see how many planes the same German pilot shot down, but on different fronts.

Here is the German ace Walter Nowotny, who was considered a favorite in the Luftwaffe ... He began to fight on the Eastern Front and by February 1944 had filled out questionnaires for 255 downed Soviet aircraft. In February, transferred to the Western Front, and even to the regiment of jet fighters. For 8 months I didn’t bring down a single enemy aircraft! And on November 8 they brought him down forever. True, it is believed that in this last battle he “hit” 3 American bombers. But this “struck” blows with something “posthumous”.

Hermann Graf in the Luftwaffe since 1938, but before the start of the war with the USSR, he did not hit any Polish or English aircraft. He was transferred to the Eastern Front in August 1941 and here until the end of 1942 he “knocked” our planes in batches, filling out questionnaires for 202 pieces (in 17 months). From January 1943 - in France, and here until the end of the war, for 29 months, he shot down only 10 aircraft. Feel the difference between East and West: we shot down more than 10 planes a month, and in the West - 10 planes in 29 months!

Gunther Rall. He began fighting in May 1940 in France and shot down 4 planes on the Western Front until the end of 1941. From the end of 1941 until April 1944 (in 28 months) it “shots down” 275 aircraft on the Eastern Front. From April 1944 to May 1945, only 2 aircraft were shot down on the Western Front.

It seems that for the aces of the Eastern Front, the Western Front was something like the Bermuda Triangle. Easily shooting down planes in the USSR, they were unable to defend the sky of their native Germany, fighting with the seemingly weaker allied pilots. What is the matter here?

Five I write, one in mind.

In my opinion, the answer is clear. The thing is that for the purpose of propaganda, on the Eastern Front, German pilots were allowed postscripts. And not by 10-20%, but several times. And so that their Oak Leaves with Swords would not be called a Salad with a Spoon and Fork in the West, the number of “downed” planes needed for an award in the East would increase all the time, both in relation to the downed planes in the West, and simply as the command estimated the value postscript. Coefficient of additions can be estimated. In the middle of the war, in the battles in the Kuban, our aircraft lost 750 aircraft (296 of them fighter planes) from air fire from land enemies and for other reasons. And the German aces at that time filled out acts on 2280 of our aircraft shot down by them in the Kuban. Therefore, we will not be mistaken if we divide the figures of the "brilliant" victories of German pilots on the Eastern Front by numbers from three to six - after all, this was what the German command did when it was awarded.

And in the West, things were not easy with postscripts. Imagine that the said Rudorffer would announce that he had shot down 13 English planes over Berlin in 17 minutes, and Goebbels would have announced this by radio. He would be ridiculed by both the Germans and the British in radio broadcasts on Germany. In the West, it was impossible to ascribe directly. They acted differently.

Shoot down or win?

In the popular publishing house "Eastern Front", another brochure has also been published, judging by the style of the same author, Asa Luftwaffe. In it, accordingly, invincible German pilots are touchingly praised.

But his gaze clings to the phrase: "Unlike the RAF (Royal Air Force), the Germans said that they did not shoot down planes, but won victories." Stop - I say to myself. Why did the Germans need this? Why did they replace (if they did) the concept of "knock down" with the concept of "win"? Further, the anonymous author tries to suggest that these two concepts are identical: "To win, it was not enough just to bring down the plane, it was necessary to provide evidence of an eyewitness ...", etc. What stupid thing? Why should the fact of the destruction of the aircraft be confused with the procedure for establishing this fact? In fact, if this author did not focus on this issue, then I would naively believe that "to bring down" is to "win." But since he really wants me to think so, then this is not the case. I begin to understand other sources and ... once again I admire the Germans' ability to organize military organizations and their love for military affairs.

Not only did they understand before our marshals that modern warfare would be very mobile, but the main thing in future mobile armies would not be what immediately catches your eye - not tanks, planes, etc. - but communications , communication and communication again.

Not only did they abandon the conspicuous idea that ground forces should be saturated with aviation. They created aviation separately from the ground forces and saturated with it only that part of the ground forces that fought and really needed aviation. And thanks to this, a relatively smaller number of aircraft cost.

Not only did they realize that aviation was not planes, but the pilots and their aviation began to be built not from military, but from training aircraft. In 1934, they began the construction of their air force by planning to have 1863 combat aircraft at the end of 1935, with 1760 training (for initial training) aircraft. And by March 1935 they had 584 military and 1304 training. As a result, their pilots entered the battle, having hundreds of hours of training flight. Their ace V. Butz (237 victories) entered the battle, having 5240 hours of training raid. And our ace G.U. Dolnikov (15 + 1) flew at the flight school for 34.5 hours, including 11 hours on their own and as much as 5 hours in a combat vehicle.

But the Germans very accurately encouraged pilots flying on the Western Front, which was very difficult for them in terms of aviation danger.

What is there to understand. In our country, in the USSR and Russia, in the civilian environment (and possibly in the military) the accents of honor are incorrectly placed. Excessively large chunks of fame fall off to fighter pilots. Meanwhile, the main force of aviation, its main strength is bombers. For the sake of bombers and there is aviation. And, by the way, it is the pilots-bombers who need the greatest courage in battle. During the Great Patriotic War, the average survivability of a fighter pilot was 64 sorties, a bomber - 48, an attack aircraft - 11 and a torpedo pilot - 3.8. Rising into the air to accompany the IL-2 attack aircraft, the fighter pilot had a six-fold greater chance of returning from the battle than the attack aircraft accompanied by him, but there is no need to talk about torpedo bombers.

An eyewitness once told me that out of 200 people graduating from one of the schools of airborne shooters flying on bombers, only one shooter returned from the war, and that one without legs. Even according to the pilots, the profession of an airborne gunner was the most dangerous profession in the war.

And we all have fighter pilots by ear, only among them are Thrice Heroes of the Soviet Union. The Germans were the opposite. The most honorary pilot of Nazi Germany was the pilot of the diving bomber Ju-87 Hans Rudel. 9 months after he was given all the Reich awards, personally for him all these awards were performed in the gold version. No one else had such an award.

The Germans very accurately understood that the main task of the fighters was not to bring down planes as such. Their main task is to allow their bombers to bomb accurately and not to allow enemy bombers to bomb precisely against their targets.

Yes, of course, if a fighter shot down an enemy bomber on the way to the target, then he completed the task very cleanly. But if he simply did not let the bombers accurately drop bombs on the target and even if he did not shoot down a single one, then he also completed the task.

But if he chased after an escort fighter and shot him down, and the bombers at that time accurately bombed, destroyed a gasoline production plant, a railway station clogged with troops, etc., then the fighter did not fulfill its mission, even writing down another one on a personal account downed plane.

Thus, the personal account of the downed aircraft stimulates the fulfillment of the main task of fighter aircraft only partially, and sometimes simply hinders its execution. After all, even in the memoirs of our pilots, cases are described when a fighter, having abandoned attacking German planes, chased after easy prey - a crashed plane, to record it for himself.

And the Germans, having simplified the personal calculation of the merits of pilots on the Eastern Front, on the Western Front, carried out a complex calculation of the differences of a fighter pilot to present him for a reward.

To obtain the Knight's Cross, for example, the pilot did not have to shoot down 40 aircraft, but gain 40 “victories”, and in fact, gain 40 points.

And these points were awarded as follows: for the downing of a single-engine aircraft - 1 point; twin-engine - 2; four-engine - 3 points. As you can see, the Germans stimulated the destruction of primarily bombers. But ...

In the ranks of British or American bombers, consisting of hundreds of vehicles, it was possible, of course, to bring down several extreme ones. But the rest would definitely drop bombs on target. And it was possible to break into operation and, without bothering with a reliable defeat, set fire to at least one engine in as many cars as possible. These planes will begin to lag behind, will begin to drop bombs, making it easier for themselves, the system will fall apart and precise bombing will fail.

Therefore, for a downed twin-engine aircraft, a German fighter pilot was entitled to 1 point, and for a four-engine plane - 2 points. By the way, for the destruction of an already damaged four-engine aircraft, only 1 point was given, that is, half as much as for its damage. In total - 3 points, as it should be for this type of aircraft, the downed aircraft itself was recorded in the personal account of someone alone.

This system, it must be said, really stimulated German fighter pilots not to bring down planes, but to prevent bombers from accurately bombing German cities and factories. In 1942, the British exported 48,000 tons of bombs to Germany with their bombers, the Germans produced 36,804 units of heavy guns, tanks, and aircraft that year. In 1943, the British and Americans already exported 207,600 tons of bombs, and the Germans fired 71,693 units of heavy weapons. In 1944, the Allies removed 915,000 tons of bombs, and the Germans fired 105,258 units of heavy weapons. The Germans didn’t make a special impression on the production of weapons by the Germans.

But we should understand that the number of "downed planes" of the German aces of the western front is the number of points they scored. The real number of really shot down aircraft is much lower. Which, however, is unlikely to degrade the merits of the pilots. And the very conversion of these points into downed planes is a perversion of propaganda, even today. During the war, the Germans on the Western Front did not powder anyone's brain, they did not write that they had “shot down”, they wrote that they had “won”.

Reality

In order to understand the truth (if possible) from propaganda materials, you need to not only be able to compare facts, but also be able to read what is not written in the text. That is, what an objective author could not write about.

We know that on the Western Front, German pilots were awarded not for the downed planes, but for the points earned. And an objective author, giving biographical information on the aces of the Western Front, would simply have to indicate how many of them shot down aircraft and how many scored points. But in the mentioned Encyclopedia ..., and Asah ..., as well as in other similar literature, all fans of the Luftwaffe are silent about points. This silence directly shouts that points are “victories”, and they are “downed planes”.

Considering the biographies of fighter pilots on the Western Front, one can estimate the number of downed aircraft in the number of “victories”.

I already wrote that 40 “victories” were required to be awarded with the Knight's Cross. And the pilots of the Western Front mentioned by me, H. Lent and G. Jabs, received these Crosses, having shot down 16 and 19 aircraft. These are really airplanes, not points, because their brands are given in biographies. Say H. Lent from September 2 to the Knight's Cross award shot down 2 Polish aircraft (PZPP.11 fighter and Elk bomber), then 2 English Wellington, 2 Norwegian Gloster Gladiator fighters, two Sunderland flying boat Gladiators, ”then 2 more Wellington and another 5 aircraft, of which it is known that 2 were Stirling four-engine bombers. That is, 40 points or 40 “victories” really meant 16-19 shot down aircraft. From here, in order to find out how many planes the German aces actually shot down on the Western Front, it is necessary to divide the number of their “victories” by 2-2.5.

But Lent received Diamonds for the Knight's Cross for 100 “victories”, and the best ace of “all times and peoples”, E. Hartmann, who fought on the Eastern Front, for 300 completed questionnaires. The coefficient between these figures is 3. Therefore, in order to assess the real number of aircraft shot down by E. Hartmann, his 352 profiles should be divided into 3 and 2-2.5, that is, 6-7.5. Since, nevertheless, our bombers were overwhelmingly not four-engine, but twin-engine, we dwell on the coefficient 6. It turns out that E. Hartmann actually shot down about 60 of our aircraft. Although it’s a lot, but ... try to find her another confirmation.

E. Hartmann (352 “victories”), G. Barkhorn (301), G. Rall (275), G. Graf (212), H. Lynfert (203) served in the same air squadron JG 52, in which there were about 100 aircraft.

In the battle of Prut, this squadron inflicted losses on our aviation units, and then the 9th Guards Air Division A.I. Pokryshkin (also about 100 aircraft) was transferred to pacify it. After these battles, H. Linnert complained "that he had never before encountered such a strong and demanding opponent." The second ace of this squadron G. Barkhorn (301 victory) was shot down.

Above, I have already quoted I.N. as a squadron Kozheduba dealt with the squadron of German aces with a loss ratio of 6: 1 in our favor.

So that's what is characteristic. The Germans knew about the regiments and formations of our aces, but they never sent their aces to "deal" with ours. Moreover, the German signal "Attention! In the air Pokryshkin" is widely known, warning its pilots about the appearance of a fighter with the number "100" on board and the need to quickly get out of the area. Yes, the German aces willingly beat our newcomers, but were not in a hurry to join the battle with our aces. But Pokryshkin on the list of “only” 59 downed planes, not 352, like Hartmann’s.

By the way, about the downs. Pokryshkin was shot down only 2 times at the very beginning of the war. Kozheduba in the first battles was knocked out. And that’s all. And Hartmann was shot down 4 times, and even taken prisoner, but he, a sly man, pretending to be wounded, fled. Barkhorn - 9 times, G. Berra (221 victories) - 18 times, Rudorffer from the Guinness Book of Records - 18 times. (I don’t remember where I read, but one of the last two had the nickname "paratrooper" in the Luftwaffe). We can say that the Germans were shot down more because they had more battles. Does not look like it. Barkhorn had one shot down in about 123 battles, and Rudorffer one in 17 battles. And Kozhedub did not have a single one for all his 120 fights. Hartmann has one parachute jump for 200 battles, but anyway - how to compare it with the lack of jumps at Kozhedub?

In addition, our pilots were mostly hard workers - they defended their bombers and shot down the German. And all the best German aces on the Eastern Front were mainly hunters - they attacked our planes when there was hope for success.

These circumstances - the fact that the German aces did not strive to fight with our aces and that even having the initiative in the battle with our rank-and-file pilots, they were mercilessly beats - are indirect evidence that their declared victories should be reduced by 6-7 times to get the number of planes they actually shot down.

As you can see, in the statistics of German “victories” there is a lot of propaganda “linden” and it is most reasonable to put an end to it. Knightly. With Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.

Control

They may ask me - why do you believe our statistics? Maybe it should be reduced by 6? I’ll answer - there’s nowhere to cut it. Reduced without us. For example, Pokryshkin believed that he had shot down 70 planes, but he is believed to still only have 59. This is not what the Germans have. We did not have the habit of posthumously attributing to anyone the three of the “affected” aircraft.

But it's not about customs. The USSR was an extremely bureaucratic country, and the bureaucratic system has features. In principle, it is possible, and sometimes required, to deceive anyone and anyone, but not the bosses. In newspapers, at meetings - lie as much as you want. But if you deceived the bosses and, especially, for the purpose of personal benefits (for example, preserving your seat, receiving a bonus, etc.), then you should be glad if you are simply removed from your post. Since the Criminal Code of the USSR until the last days there was an article about postscripts, and under Stalin it also acted in combination with treason.

Chief Marshal of Aviation, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union A.A. Novikov, to help his relative, drug addict of the USSR aircraft industry, Colonel General, Hero of Socialist Labor A.I. Shakhurin to cope with the implementation of monthly plans for the construction of military aircraft, forced the aviation military representatives during the war to accept unusable aircraft, i.e. they attributed unusable aircraft to fit aircraft. Neither the war nor the Victory have written off this. In 1946, everything was opened and both sat down for it. Neither the title nor the star helped. Twice Hero served his 6 years "from bell to bell". And he was lucky.

Because the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the hero of the defense of Leningrad, A.A. Kuznetsov and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky was not at all lucky - they were shot for their posts.

You say - well, they attributed the pilot a dubious victory - where is the selfish interest here? The fact is that they paid 1,000 rubles for a downed single-engine plane, and 2,000 for a twin-engine one. And as if in the name of fame and propaganda, I didn’t want to add a couple of downed planes to the lists, but neither regiment commanders, nor nachfins, nor auditors risk would not dare their posts. Who was hunting with a rifle at the ready and screaming “cheers” to take the skyscrapers in the penalty battalion?

In the border battles of 1941, the 8th mechanized corps lost all its equipment. The remnants of the corps were supposed to go out on German rear to 650 km on foot. Given the wounded, weapons and ammunition, they could not take anything extra with them. At that time, commander N.K. Popel buried all the staff and party documents, but took the bag of money from the box office to his own. Popel understood that it would be easier for him to explain the loss of secret documents than where he had made the money.

A fighter pilot Vasily Stalin for the war from a senior lieutenant became a lieutenant general, but he had only 3 shot down planes. Everyone could do for him, they could please everyone except this. You yourself understand that if in the USSR Air Force there were records of downed planes (not in the Sovinformburo - they were attributed ruthlessly there), then they were attributed to Vasily at least in order to make him an ace (at the beginning of the war, 5, and then 10 shot down aircraft).

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