Bagration Soviet doctrine of holding the front linearly

by Luka Bilić

-In 1941 Soviet doctrine of holding the front linearly, and orientation on ‘offensive defense’ played right into German hands. When it was time to run, orders would come to attack in opposite direction, right in the depths of calamity and creating pockets..When Germans would brake through and take possession of good roads and communication centers, Soviet forces would continue to hold worthless terrain between lines of communication in accordance with their outdated linear disposition principles.

During Bagration, German defences were asymmetrical, heavily concentrated on valuable ground while only screening hardly passable wilderness with virtually nonexistent infrastructure. Germans arguably also had problems with belated withdrawal orders(still nowhere near as belated as Soviet ones in Barbarossa, among other things because of real time communications and insight in situation, while Soviets had to send envoys who had to find units first, then send messengers back, then receive reply and so forth..hopeless all in all), but it was because they were reluctant to give possession of crucial lines of communications and transport centers, while in other less essential areas, retreat orders were issued more liberally.

-In 1944 like in 1941 Germans were the army that understood the advantagees of utilization of good roads and transport hubs and heavily relied on them. In Belorussia, Germans tenaciously defended transport centers and lines of communications, using them to rapidly extract units from endangered areas, while they simultaneously denied them to the Soviets who had to overtake those retreating troops through the swamps, forests and dirt paths if they wanted to entrap them. Amazingly they were often successful. Germans also used those lines to bring reinforcements as rapidly and as far forward as possible, to critical areas in bid to control Soviet advance. Germans were masters in use and denial of lines of communications, therefore even when their forces were routing, enough composure was regularly retained to blow up bridges and destroy railways. Indeed Soviets hardly captured any, even local, bridges in the wake of retreating Germans, likewise railroads were thoroughly destroyed. Luckily Soviet engineers were masters of pontoon bridging and railway restoration..Contrastly during Barbarossa Soviets hardly understood (or at least acted like they understood) the importance of communication routes and centers. In stead of concentrating on defense of transport centers, where Germans had to pass and where pitched battle would be forced out of elusive enemy, they stubbornly tried to defend everywhere evenly. Infrastructure, especially bridges were inexplicably, for greatest part, allowed to fall in enemy hands undamaged.(for example, completely surreally, all the railway bridges over Dvina and Dnepr in AGN and AGC area were captured intact though they had at least few weeks time to destroy them). This greatly facilitated German advance in short, mid and even long term period as it could take up to couple of years to completely restore destroyed railways bridges.

-In both Bagration and Barbarossa attacking side achieved virtual air supremacy. Yet while in Barbarossa Luftwaffe could attack practically any target with impunity, Wehrmacht in 1944 had ample anti aircraft assets and most units could at least to a degree defend themselves from air attacks, while key objects like bridges and similar were heavily guarded.

-As Red Army advanced through Belorussia they were more and more exposed to counter attacks by increasingly numerous German reinforcements, while their own strength and logistical support were diminishing. German counter attacks were prudent, aimed at holding lines of communications open until units escaped, to impede Red Army advance or secure areas where arriving reinforcements were forming.

In 1941 Soviet counter attacks were uncoordinated, premature, without much purpose, rather mechanically thrown into teeth of German onslaught. They presented no real danger to the invaders and spent virtually all mechanised assets if the army in less than fortnight in senseless, suicidal attacks. Those mobile formations could’ve been used later when friction and overextended logistics took tall of Wehrmacht to great effect, but nothing was left.

Considering these comparations, Red Army had much tougher enemy in 1944 than Germans had during their sucker punch invasion of 1941. Yet success of respective operations is comparable which only adds additional weight to this greatest of allied victories in second world war.