(X)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

Part 10- Conclusion
In the end, result of war in the east was mostly about what Soviets were doing, not the Germans, it was their unprecedented sacrifice and effort that broke German war machine, rather than any mistakes Germans committed at least after summer of 1941 when Germans were no longer in control, but had to rely on Soviet mistakes and weaknesses rather on own achievements.
Thoroughly amazing Soviet mobilization was one of main reasons that enabled Soviet state to withstand German storm and then take the fight to the enemy. During the war Soviets created incredible 700 new divisions demonstrating power hardly anyone expected. Crucial period of raising this army and blunting German power was dark period of 1941/1942 in which Soviets stood pretty much alone, with minimal foreign aid or distraction of German forces. At least as impressive as quantity aspects, is aspect of ever increasing quality of Red Army achieved during incessant crisis and lethal struggle. In spite of constant urgent needs, means were found to continuously improve efficiency of the army through ever improving training, doctrine, leadership, organization and logistics.Very important factor that contributed to maturation of the Red Army was preventing the enemy from destroying entire units somewhere in mid 1942. This prevented dissipation of experience and quality of forces and greatly contributed to its accumulation. Conversely roughly at the same time, from Stalingrad, it was time for Germans to start writing off entire units with their irreplaceable veterans, experience and accumulated experience and expertise.
Impact of Barbarossa was nothing short of cataclysmic on Soviet state, society and army, German sucker punch invasion created effect comparable to one beginning a brutal fight to the death by enemy cutting one of your hands by surprise and then pressing on relentlessly with intention to kill. How did Soviets survive loss of entire pre war army and equipment, loss of thousands of factories, primary farm lands, raw materials and perhaps worst one third of potential workforce? To be sure in 1941 Soviets were deeply wounded, but found strength through incredible display of will and courage to turn things around. Some key aspects that enabled such resilience were carefully planned in advance, like buildings of industrial base (heavy industry, chemical industry, military industrial complex and so on), mass production principles, mechanised agriculture and most importantly capacity of people to endure and their will to give everything they had, resulting in entire population participating in war effort, from women in armed forces to women and young in factories and agriculture, doing 12 hour shifts with a free day every two weeks, strict food and goods rationing and so on.
German main presumption was that Soviet state will crumble and that its people would refuse to suffer in losing war just like 20 year before. Instead they were met by probably most determined and courageous stance in history of war, and probably all other factors notwithstanding, this alone doomed nazi dreams of lordship in the east.

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