(VI)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort
Part 6- Importance of unit continuity and key change in breakdown of Soviet losses
Though Germans were destroying less and less units in entirety( 75 in 1942 compared to 155 in just 6 months of 1941), manpower losses were still huge, though steadily declining.
Why did it matter if entire units were lost? It was of decisive importance that units as a whole weren’t lost, even if its strength dropped sharply. When units are lost or dismissed loss occurs of accumulated experience of the officers and NCOs, who maintained units tradition and integrity, also close bonds existing in a unit among individual soldiers are lost. If unit survives even as a skeleton force, these experiences and veterans can be effectively used to rapidly reinforce such unit with new troops to much better unit than it would be the case if it was created from scratch.Loss of weapons is also much greater when entire units were destroyed(usually in encirclement) instead just weakened in battles. Thus in 1941 5,5 million rifles and 40 000 artillery pieces were lost in mere six months. This was beyond any doubt unsustainable ratio for SU, and war would’ve been lost soon if it continued. Yet in 1942, in 12 months 2,2 million rifles and 25 000 artillery pieces were lost, reduction by factor of four. In 1943 only 1 and a quarter million rifles were lost and 12 000 artillery pieces, halving them again.In 1944 losses rose again due to German desperate last ditch efforts to increase production and switch to stubborn defense in order to wear Red Army down, but losses remained well below 1942 figures, while Wehrmacht was gutted in non stop offensives. Similar ratios apply to other categories of weapons like MGs, anti tank guns etc, tank forces being an exception because they were main offensive weapon, always ‘pushed up front’, used for breaking open the German lines and then inserted deep behind enemy lines where they were both exposed to counter attacks, ambushes and with compromised supply lines. All this led to constantly high (though sustainable) tank losses.Regarding manpower losses one may wonder why such fundamental change in number of destroyed units didn’t relate more to the number of total losses. Indeed total losses jumped from 4,5 million men in 1941 to 7,3 million in 1942 (still an appreciable decrease considering that 1941 war only lasted 6 months), and in 1943 almost leveled to around 7,8 million. In 1944 number dropped to 6,8 million. The key is in distribution of those losses.While in 1941 ratio of irrecoverable(dead and captured) and recoverable losses(sick and wounded) was at devastatingly high 5:2, in 1942 it dropped to 3:4- change by factor of more than 3 (three times less). In 1943 1:2,4 - decrease by almost factor of two (two times less), and in 1944 1:3. The change of this ratio was consequential to diminishing German ability to outmaneuver and encircle Red Army formations and take numerous prisoners. This means that even if total casualty numbers were dropping mildly, already in 1942 and especially in 1943 huge part of those losses were wounded and sick who would mostly return to the ranks instead of being permanent loss.
Management of the wounded was very efficient and as many as three quarters returned to duty in less than 60 days, while more came later. The percentage that was deemed unfit for further combat wasn’t sent home but to less demanding posts in the rear or in training facilities to serve as i
nstructors while able bodied men from those posts were released to active duty, thus minimizing the actual losses from recoverable losses.
Irrecoverable losses were constantly dropping as well. While in 1941 there were some 3,2 million permanent losses, rate leveled to roughly the same number in 1942, but it meant that monthly losses halved(only six months of war in 1941). In 1943 there were around 2,3 million permanent losses (three times less per month than 1941), and 1,7 million in 1944( almost 4 times less per month than in 1941).
Illustration of the data above can be seen in the statistics that the average daily loss of divisions and tank corps during offensive operations dropped from 120 per day in 1943 to 60 in 1944 (comparable overall losses indicate that the army had much more days being on the offensive in 1944 compared to 1943). Simultaneously rate of dead and captured compared to wounded and sick jumped from 1:1,5 at Stalingrad and Kursk to 1 dead or captured for every three wounded in 1944. Together this means that permanent losses fell from 60 to 15 per division or tank corp per day while on offensive. Red Army performance was becoming dramatically more sustainable by every year.
Why did it matter if entire units were lost? It was of decisive importance that units as a whole weren’t lost, even if its strength dropped sharply. When units are lost or dismissed loss occurs of accumulated experience of the officers and NCOs, who maintained units tradition and integrity, also close bonds existing in a unit among individual soldiers are lost. If unit survives even as a skeleton force, these experiences and veterans can be effectively used to rapidly reinforce such unit with new troops to much better unit than it would be the case if it was created from scratch.Loss of weapons is also much greater when entire units were destroyed(usually in encirclement) instead just weakened in battles. Thus in 1941 5,5 million rifles and 40 000 artillery pieces were lost in mere six months. This was beyond any doubt unsustainable ratio for SU, and war would’ve been lost soon if it continued. Yet in 1942, in 12 months 2,2 million rifles and 25 000 artillery pieces were lost, reduction by factor of four. In 1943 only 1 and a quarter million rifles were lost and 12 000 artillery pieces, halving them again.In 1944 losses rose again due to German desperate last ditch efforts to increase production and switch to stubborn defense in order to wear Red Army down, but losses remained well below 1942 figures, while Wehrmacht was gutted in non stop offensives. Similar ratios apply to other categories of weapons like MGs, anti tank guns etc, tank forces being an exception because they were main offensive weapon, always ‘pushed up front’, used for breaking open the German lines and then inserted deep behind enemy lines where they were both exposed to counter attacks, ambushes and with compromised supply lines. All this led to constantly high (though sustainable) tank losses.Regarding manpower losses one may wonder why such fundamental change in number of destroyed units didn’t relate more to the number of total losses. Indeed total losses jumped from 4,5 million men in 1941 to 7,3 million in 1942 (still an appreciable decrease considering that 1941 war only lasted 6 months), and in 1943 almost leveled to around 7,8 million. In 1944 number dropped to 6,8 million. The key is in distribution of those losses.While in 1941 ratio of irrecoverable(dead and captured) and recoverable losses(sick and wounded) was at devastatingly high 5:2, in 1942 it dropped to 3:4- change by factor of more than 3 (three times less). In 1943 1:2,4 - decrease by almost factor of two (two times less), and in 1944 1:3. The change of this ratio was consequential to diminishing German ability to outmaneuver and encircle Red Army formations and take numerous prisoners. This means that even if total casualty numbers were dropping mildly, already in 1942 and especially in 1943 huge part of those losses were wounded and sick who would mostly return to the ranks instead of being permanent loss.
Management of the wounded was very efficient and as many as three quarters returned to duty in less than 60 days, while more came later. The percentage that was deemed unfit for further combat wasn’t sent home but to less demanding posts in the rear or in training facilities to serve as i
nstructors while able bodied men from those posts were released to active duty, thus minimizing the actual losses from recoverable losses.Irrecoverable losses were constantly dropping as well. While in 1941 there were some 3,2 million permanent losses, rate leveled to roughly the same number in 1942, but it meant that monthly losses halved(only six months of war in 1941). In 1943 there were around 2,3 million permanent losses (three times less per month than 1941), and 1,7 million in 1944( almost 4 times less per month than in 1941).
Illustration of the data above can be seen in the statistics that the average daily loss of divisions and tank corps during offensive operations dropped from 120 per day in 1943 to 60 in 1944 (comparable overall losses indicate that the army had much more days being on the offensive in 1944 compared to 1943). Simultaneously rate of dead and captured compared to wounded and sick jumped from 1:1,5 at Stalingrad and Kursk to 1 dead or captured for every three wounded in 1944. Together this means that permanent losses fell from 60 to 15 per division or tank corp per day while on offensive. Red Army performance was becoming dramatically more sustainable by every year.
by Luka Bilić
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