(VII)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

Part 7- Maintaining the army strength and sources of manpower

Where did people for SU’s huge mobilization come from and was ratio of influx of men to losses sustainable? To start from the basics,women and children took over male jobs in agriculture and factories, freeing men for military service. Women themselves gave full contribution to war effort not only by taking over male jobs but by directly serving in armed forces itself as more than 2 million did, serving in all kind of units, not just usual female posts like rear services, anti aircraft, drivers or in signal units, but also as mechanics, pilots(even fighter pilots), tank crews and even infantry. Another important factor facilitating Soviet response to invasion was improvement of general population health during the 30s, which enabled for rejection rate based on health reasons for the army to be as low as 5%, similar to German army, while only couple of decades before Imperial Army was crippled by 30% rejection rate on health grounds. As mentioned before vast pool of trained reservists played very important role in 1941, this was ready source of relatively well trained men when needs dictated frantic pace of creating new units. Other more regular source was annual class of young men coming of military age(18). From generations of 1921 and 1922 only 2 million men annually reached 18 in 1939 and 1940, because of still ongoing Civil War in SU. Beginning in 1923 baby boom happened following end of the war and New Economic Policy resulting in 3 million boys reaching 18 from 1941 onwards in pre 1939 territory of USSR. Nazi conquest of western SU and seizure of one third of manpower reduced this to about 2 million annually. This wasn’t enough to make good of huge losses from Barbarossa and to make additional units, so in late 1941 and early 1942 less ‘exemplary’ recruits had to be found. Men in their 30s and 40s were massively called up to fill the temporary gap. Creating new units with (for military standards) old men, poorly equipped and hastly trained wasn’t sustainable practice and reflected the fact that in 1941 Soviets were losing the war and could take only so much of such punishing. Luckily Germans lacked strength to keep such pressure and the Red Army was also raising in quality. So, already in 1942 with reduction of losses and much greater percentage of losses becoming wounded (returning in very high percentage) situation became much more favorable. Other measures were also taken to rationalize manpower and create surplus. In April 1942 for example 100 artillery-machine gun battalions were created in order to replace manpower in quiet sectors. New weapons made themselves felt as if sectors weren’t weakened and freed manpower was used for creation of new units. After 1942 crisis was overcome and situation became sustainable. Need for new troops was entirely met by young recruits turning 18 , returning wounded and men recruited from liberated territories. The letter were called ‘booty troops’ by the Germans and fell into several categories. First there were older reservists who had undergone military training before the war. These men were assigned to units with very little training, having to draw on their training and learn from veterans as they went. Second category were young men turning 18 in liberated territories. These men required significantly more training and were trained like other recruits- 6 months in main from late 1942 onwards. There were about half a million such young men coming of age annually in the western SU, by 1943 when liberation begun two generations(of 1941/42 and 1942/43) were already of age and two more would become of age in 1944/45. This means around 2 millions of these recruits, mostly in 1943,and early 1944 were mobilized. Other categories included partisans, force labor, POWs etc. Germans were trying to prevent ‘booty troops’ from falling into Soviet hands and thus forcibly tried to take as many of working age population with them while retreating, simply using them as slaves. But by 1943 their withdrawals were so rapid that they seldom managed to do this effectively. Thus by 1943 all the war needs were met by men turning 18 and men in newly liberated territories of SU. While in 1941/42 such sustainable sources produced less than 2 million troops, and had to be augmented by mobilizing various age and social categories, in 1943-45 it was at least 3 million per year. No manpower needed being taken from the economy any more or of inappropriate age, making manpower issues more than sustainable. Lowering of permanent losses and losses in general and lowering of irrecoverable to recoverable losses ratio plus increased supply of manpower meant that by 1944 SU had surplus of men and began to discharge specialists and qualified workforce back into economy to start rebuilding devastated country.

by Luka Bilić