(V) Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

1942 summer crisis and the end of unsustainability of Soviet war effort

In late spring of 1942 Soviets undertook several ill fated offensives from Leningrad region, to bigger ones in Crimea and Izyum(Kharkov). All of them were costly failures because of yet insufficiently trained troops and officers, unmatured doctrine and tactics, command and control, reconnaissance but also very importantly political meddling that insisted on actions and solutions contrary to professional advice (pushing deeper in a trap at Izum as typical example). Defeats at Harkov(Izum) and Crimea alone cost Red Army 25 divisions completely destroyed, compared to only two from beginning of the year. These defeats failed in their basic intention to wear Germans down and retake initiative. On the opposite, they created perfect conditions for the Germans to strike greatly weakened Red Army in southern part of the front.

Operation Blau created big crisis and contrary to some myths that Red Army was simply trading space for time, there was ferocious fighting in July, around Voronez, in the Don bend and so on. For example only on the northern sector of Blau, Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts in mere month after beginning of operations lost some 2400 tanks in relentless and determined if still inept attacks in attempt to stop German offensive. In these July battles 17 divisions were destroyed entirely. It is true that political leadership around that time broke with catastrophic practice to hold onto already outflanked positions, thus drastically reduced number of POWs compared to 1941, but this doesn’t mean fighting wasn’t massive and brutal. Summer crisis yet again forced premature commitment of Soviet reserves before they were fully equipped and trained, again creating much bigger losses than army prepared to fight would suffer. State of STAVKA strategic reserves (units already deployed but held in reserve, not to be confused with units that are still training and being equipped) reflected this- from 62 in July to just 23 in August and 17 in October. Reinforcements were sent from Transbaikal and Siberian districts-4 divisions and Far Eastern district, 3 divisions, signifying severity of situation, still Far Eastern army was quickly reinforced afterwards. In June 12 new divisions were formed and six tank brigades, while in July 13 new divisions and 23 new brigades were created as emergency measures. Additionally 23 tank brigades were created in July.That meant that in July 1300 tanks were available for new units after losses in existing units were replaced.

What is very interesting about those 23 tank brigades is that only 3 of them were sent into battles in Stalingrad region, 6 to strategic reserve and 14 were designated as training brigades. In midst of great crisis, while attention of the world was on German relentless advance toward Stalingrad and Caucasus and ‘drastic’ measures to boost morale and discipline were being implemented (like order 227), in the background Soviets were building reserves and even more significantly creating vast base for training that will be able to meet huge requirements for trained men(and women) as industry was producing unprecedented numbers of tanks (and other weapons).

In August, September and October cumulatively just 18 new divisions, 16 brigades and 5 tank brigades were created. Again most of the effort went into replacements of existing units and upgrading of brigades into divisions by joining two by two and adding support units in anticipation of upcoming big offensives. Similarly in November and December just 3 new divisions were formed and 5 rifle brigades.There was a clear trend in 1942 toward creating less and less divisions. From June to December only 47 divisions, 62 brigades and 44 tank brigades were created compared to preceding 6 months in which period 143 divisions, 118 brigades and 130 tank brigades were created. Creation of new troops and equipment was actually catching speed but they more and more went to existing units and less to new units being created from zero. This was a clear sign that Germans weren’t destroying nearly as many whole units as before. In first seven months of 1942 44 divisions were totally destroyed and in last five only 31 (compared to 138 in same period from the previous year). All together,in 6 months of 1941 155 divisions were lost and in 12 months of 1942 only 75, the difference is by factor of four. After November of 1942 only single division was entirely destroyed and abolished until the end of the war.

This however doesn’t mean that losses were nowhere near as small as this statistic suggests, but it does mean that Wehrmacht wasn’t destroying entire units anymore and weren’t capable to successfully pull their favorite trick on the Red Army-Bewegungskrieg (war of maneuvers) with the purpose of delivering its spectacular finish, Kesselschlacht (battle of encirclement and annihilation). War of attrition had set in for good, which was de facto end of the game for the Germans, especially if we consider that Western Allies were yet to make their main moves and their help to SU just starting to arrive by late 1942 in any significant quantities.

by Luka Bilić