Rzhev

On January 10th 1942 there was sense of emergency and alarm in German 9th Army at Rzhev as Soviet 29th and 39th armies were pushing uncontrollingly into their rear from north and north west. Same day Japanese declared war on Dutch East Indies while in Germany invitations, dispatched by Heidrich for Wannsee conference on which implementation of Final Solution was to be organized were received by their attendants. American and Filipino troops were fighting for their lives on Bataan..

Yet by far the most important events were talking place in mansion near Kirov gates in Moscow where STAVKA (headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR) was located. It was STAVKA’s job to operationally and strategically direct war effort and simultaneously to provide guidance and preside over the evolution of the Red Army considering matters of doctrines, tactics, organization, logistics and so on. On January 10th General Zhukov issued STAVKA directive No 03. This directive set some of basic principles how Red Army was going to fight for the rest of the war. Mass charges or human wave tactics were not to rarely used in 1941 due to lack of sophistication of both officers and soldiers, means of communication, lack of equipment and training but many times also out of sheer necessity(like for example when trying to break out of encirclements). Such tactics were from early on advised against by top officers like Zhukov and others, but now formally in STAVKA directive form that advised use of smaller infantry component but massively expanding supporting arms like armour, air force and artillery. Role of the Shock Group was emphasized in offensive operations. Fronts or Armies weren’t to attack evenly distributed anymore, but to concentrate it’s most potent assets into such groups that would lead the effort of larger formations. Furthermore, attack frontage was to be dramatically reduced in order to concentrate strength on narrow sector and achieve overwhelming numerical and material superiority over the enemy on particular local point of the front. Thus Front (army group) level attack would have width of only 30 kilometres, and army just 15. Attacks were to be accompanied by powerful artillery support first engaging prepared defences, and then moving deeper as assault begins toward artillery positions, lines of communications and beyond, supporting penetration and exploitation phases. Role of ground attack air force was along the same lines.

In theory such concentration on small sectors should’ve guaranteed break through but there was more to it of course. First precondition was operational security, deception and stealthness of movement/camouflage. All this was contained in Soviet concept of maskirovka that was far from perfected by that time. Actually every Red Army offensive so far was noticed and had to fight against prepared, awaiting enemy. Only by the time of Uranus did Red Army demonstrate high level of maskirovka mastering, which was IMO one of defining moments of the entire war. For variety of reasons Wehrmacht was still in that time significantly superior to the Red Army. Reasons had to do with command and control, reconnaissance, air power, coordination, mobility, resupply and field repair capabilities, training, experience and so on. For these reasons even with numerical superiority Red Army routinely wasn’t able to break through German lines and conversely German concentrated effort ripped open Soviet lines wherever and whenever it wanted. This wasn’t sustainable in the long run and war couldn’t be won this way. Things had to change, and they did, with subtle signs at first. On 30th June 1942 for the first time Soviet defences held and badly mauled German Schwerepunkt. Stumme’s XXXX Panzer Corps was prevented in braking the lines of Soviet 21st Army during opening of Blau. What was very significant here was the fact that Germans were concentrated, attacking on point of their choosing, in full supply, in clear weather and under ubiquitous protection of devastating close air support umbrella. Furthermore, German leading formation 23rd Panzer Division alone lost only in first day 10 completely destroyed tanks and 50 more knocked out, panzer regiment commander killed, one battalion commander , two company commanders and several platoon leaders with minimal damage to the enemy. Finally breakthrough wasn’t achieved in Schwerepunkt sector, but on other sector within few days, and business went on as usual, so this premier was forgotten. Soon after operation Wirbelwind that concentrated 6 panzer divisions also failed to break Soviet lines and suffered heavy losses. (only one of panzer divisions involved, 9th lost 44 out of 110 tanks it had in the start). Reversely Timoshenko’s forces overrun few weak German divisions on the start of his overall very badly planned and ill-fated Kharkov offensive(second Kharkov), but initial power with which enemy prepared front was opened surely didn’t resemble unimpressive Red Army of previous year. Still Timoshenko achieved tactical surprise and had weak divisions (including security and allied formations) to deal with. Real premier was probably on 4th August 1942 when Zhukov destroyed German defences on 30 km wide front in 9th army sector near. These were fit, entrenched, battle hardened German units, but still front was ripped open, even if ultimately exploitation in depth was unsuccessful. These were subtle signs indeed, deafened by subsequent German successes. Yet signs were there and quality gap was narrowing.

STAVKA and Zhukov were steering the Red Army into right direction, but army needed much more training, coordination and experience to efficiently implement instructions from directive No3 and likes. Nevertheless such strategic guidance, if set into right direction was of paramount importance for entirety of further efforts to be meaningful and efficient.

by Luka Bilić