(IX)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

Part 9- Battle for production and growing firepower of the Red Army

Aside from troop training and quality , battle of materiel was one of most important aspects of the war. After Soviet losses of 1941 of both weapons, raw material, industry, and so on, Soviets were in a fast line toward defeat. In 1942 things started to change drastically. Tank production jumped from some 6.5 thousand in 1941 to more than 25 000 in 1942. Breakdown of tank types is also important as production of medium tanks rose for more than 400% (from around 3000 to more than 12000) and heavy tanks almost 100%. In 1943 27 000 tanks and SUs were made (some 3500 SUs), of which only around 5000 were light tanks(drop of almost 50% to previous year). In 1944 32.5 thousands tanks and SUs were produced.

Machine pistols were seen as instrumental in increasing firepower of infantry, thus were produced in huge quantities. At begging of 1942 Army had 100 000 of them in stock, at the end of 1943, 2,64 millions. On 1/1/1942, one machine pistol came on 37 carabines, on 1/1/1943 one came on every 5 carabines, which means every squad had at least few automatic weapons. Heavy machine guns doubled in stock in a single year, from 1942 to 1943(to 133 000). Artillery production exploded, and between 11/42 and 7/43 incredible 175 000 guns were produced. In 9 months period Soviets produced almost double amount of guns Germans managed to produce during entire war so far. Battle of production was already won!

By second half of 1943 Soviets were leveling and then reducing artillery production. By 1944 most of weapons categories were leveling in production as output comfortably outmatched the needs. This production resulted in huge rise in firepower of Red Army rifle (combined arms) units. After being largely left to mercy of enemy armor and air power in 1941 and early/mid 1942, Red Army infantry was given more teeth and means to protect themselves.

In 1942 and again in 1943 authorized number of men in rifle divisions was reduced but the support of heavy weapons remained unchanged or even increased, thus creating more powerful units in terms of firepower. In just first six months of 1943 full 36 anti aircraft divisions were created and 27 brigades of tank destroyers. By July of 1943 there were huge 211 tank brigades and regiments available to support 462 of combined arms divisions and 98 brigades. These armored units weren’t part of tank corps and armies, but were assigned to infantry support only. Until the end of the war less and less men were sent to rifle companies and more and more to supporting units like artillery, tank, SU, anti air and so on. This can be seen in a fact that in 1942 desired strength of the Red Army was achieved, around 6.5 million men and it was maintained until the end of the war. All of this stands in contrast to pretty well established myths that Soviets were at the end of their strength by late war and that they didn’t care about infantry support. Soviets actually strove to provide maximum support for their infantry when it became possible after desperate period of the early war. For example when division rotated to the rear in order to accept and train reinforcements, its heavy weapons would remain at the front to support other units. As war progressed, instead of relying on large infantry component, rifle companies were reduced, but instead lavishly supported by tanks, artillery, automatic weapons and so on.

From early 1943 Soviets combined their advanced pre war theories with war experience and adequate equipment production and created new, previously unseen kind of animal in the Red Army. Tank armies of 1943 finally hit right balance of various army arms, excluded rifle units that were usually attached to them before, becoming completely mobile force, in accordance with pre war doctrines for conducting independent mobile warfare. They had over 600 tanks each and 22 battalions of motorised infantry. They consisted of two tank corps, mechanised corps, a motorcycle regiment, anti aircraft division, a tank destroyer regiment, a howitzer regiment and a guards mortar regiment. In support there was a service regiment, an engineer regiment, a motor transport regiment, two tank repair battalions, medical units and variety of specialized units, like unit for evacuation of captured tanks. Considering these quantitative but also equally pronounced qualitative changes it is clear that Germans starting with 1943 couldn’t count on the same Red army they were bashing in first year and a half of the war. Still predominantly Germans disregarded this and continued to count on continually dealing with the Red Army from the beginning of the war hoping to continually sell them same tricks in form of mobile defense or similar wishful concepts and somehow win the war of attrition.

By the end of 1942 Soviets had enough units and continually superior reserves to win the war. From then on they focused on maintaining existing units and upgrading them. In 1943 72 new divisions were formed, mostly by combining brigades and strengthening them with support units. In 1944 18 new divisions were formed and just 3 in 1945. Newly formed units from these years were for large part held in strategic reserves. In July 1943 for instance 58 combined arms divisions, 14 tank brigades and 12 rifle brigades were in reserve, and in August 1944 with offensives raging from Finland to Romania, full 7 armored corps were held in reserve.

by Luka Bilić