(IV)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

Part 4

Battle of Moscow and beginning of recovery from wounds of 1941

What seemed to entire world as ‘miracle before Moscow’, an inexplicable resurgence of Red Army and reversal of war luck, were in fact units of second wave of mobilization (August-November) that took the fight to the enemy after units from the first wave (June ,July) grind them to a halt but at huge cost . Ten Soviet armies with 71 divisions (only 3 tank and 1 motorised) hit exposed German positions before Moscow. Offensive was first strategic surprise of the war for the Germans as STAVKA and Zhukov skilfully harboured and deployed these divisions.
Zhukov’s plan included holding attacks in the center and deep thrusts from the flanks, where main forces were concentrated, aiming to retake main railhead of AGC at Vyazma which would be its death sentence. This plan required mobile warfare, but by this stage both sides were pretty much waging a poor man’s war..Moscow counter offensive was mostly an infantry offensive supported by very limited amount of mechanized forces. Secondly but also of critical importance deep December snow nullified practically all of Red Army’s tactical mobility and allowed Germans to concentrate on defense of main roads where even simple roadblocks were hard to overcome in costly and time consuming frontal attacks as they couldn’t be flanked through impassable snow. All this factors resulted in Germans being pushed back rather than encircled and destroyed, though they were mauled. Still defeat at Moscow was a major turning point of a war and huge morale boost for the Soviets who after smelling some serious German blood for the first time, were determined to fight to final victory, further German successes notwithstanding.
While attention of the Germans,Red Army and the world was on drama unfolding before Moscow, behind the lines another massive wave of mobilization was beginning in December. 74 new divisions were raised in December, as well as 70 brigades and 8 tank brigades. Much of these units were raised in the ‘provinces’ , mostly Ural, Siberia and Central Asia, which again proved their worth, as always good part of units was raised in Moscow region (around one fifth of them). These December units had in average around 4 months of training before deployment, part of them even more. This third wave that started in December and lasted into early 1942 was enabled by call of 1million new recruits from young men turning 18 and partly from reservists. Production also finally started to recover in December and especially in following months.
When line is drawn under 1941, it was a frightful year in which 155 Red Army divisions were completely destroyed. When we add to this loss of a third of workforce and manpower, thousands of factories, raw materials, agricultural potential and so on, incredible 357 divisions, 153 brigades and 71 tank brigades that were created in mere 7 months look like plainly impossible achievement, ever more impressive as one research it more. This is the main reason why Barbarossa failed, and indeed German intentions to destroy SU.In January third wave continued with creation of 10 new divisions and 12 rifles brigades.
February brought 12 more new divisions and 9 brigades. Second month of 1942 was a major milestone in one other sense, industrial production finally substantially recovered after relocation of industry and confusion of 1941. As a result, incredible 50 tank brigades were created in February. These tank brigades had between 2 and 5 months of training before being committed which is great improvement over rapidly deployed brigades of 1941 when urgent front needs and perpetual crisis supported the vicious circle of poorly trained tank units and high losses.In March another 16 combined arms divisions, 13 rifle brigades and as much as 39 tank brigades were created.In April new system became dominant, main effort was deflected from creating units from scratch toward merging of numerous existing, infantry heavy, brigades into full blooded divisions, a process that included additional training (minimum 4 months, and some more), equipping with additional support units and so on. This was a clear sign that crisis of production had passed and that enough weapons and equipment were being produced not only to replenish current losses of existing units but to massively equip and create additional ones. That’s why in April only 2 new divisions and 4 brigades were created, but still very high number of tank brigades, 17 of them, were created.This became new standard and in May upgrading of brigades continued. No new divisions were created, only 8 brigades and still high 10 tank brigades, half of which were created in the Far East to counter the threat of Kwantung army that was waiting its opportunity and had been heavily reinforced during spring.Third wave of Soviet mobilization lasted from December 1941 roughly to May 1942, in this time entire new army was created numbering 143 divisions, 118 brigades and staggering 130 tank brigades. These third wave divisions were used in abortive late spring Soviet offensives and chaotic fighting in the summer, yet most significant role had those of them that were transferred to Stalingrad region late in the year to take part in counter offensive, seemingly appearing from the thin air.

by Luka Bilić