(II)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort

Part two-impact of Barbarossa and Soviet initial mobilization

Barbarossa was a level 5 hurricane coming from clear skies on a sleepy June sunday. All the warnings aside invasion still appeared to be total surprise. While in the background frenetic preparations were being made, in the field,reflecting Stalin’s desperate wish to gain more time and wishful thinking that apparent(and real) lack of readiness will somehow deter aggression because SU wouldn’t look like a threat, army was in disarray and caught in worst possible moment and circumstances in midst of reforms and expansion. Reforms and reorganization were as overdue as they were essential but to be caught by surprise attack in midst of such turmoil caused much more confusion and ineffectiveness compared to army that wasn’t reforming or expanding, even though long term capacity to wage war depended on these changes.

By 3rd July head of OKH, general Halder confined to his diary that he believes war was fundamentally already won. This was since repeatedly used as sign of German arrogance and stupidity, which is partly true,but if we look from his eyes and what he believed at the moment, it looks different. By that time 90 percent of Soviet armored formations grouped in unwieldy mechanized corps were destroyed in suicidal counter attacks without reconnaissance, logistics or air support. Of Combined arms armies many were already destroyed or encircled with the rest unable to seriously challenge German juggernaut. If in that situation German estimates about Soviets having potential to raise just 35 divisions in the rest of the year were true, Halder wouldn’t had been wrong to celebrate. Only their calculation was ‘slightly’ wrong..

Soviet pre war army that was hit by German aggression had some 180 divisions available to engage the Wehrmacht. This included army in western districts, reserves and army in other districts that could and would be mowed to the west. Actually impressive force, that had no chance to give real measures of its worth. While already in early July most potent parts of this army were lost, behind the lines miracle was happening, greatest mobilization in history had begun. In June and July Soviets produced mind boggling 157 new divisions, more than a third of them in Moscow district demonstrating power and potential of that region. Other significant contributors were Leningrad, Orel, Odessa military districts, all in the west of the country. Only 22 divisions were formed in central, southern, northern and eastern districts.These soldiers were thrown into battle after just 1-2 months of training (lowest in entire war) because trained and equipped regular army that was meant to buy time for mobilization was melting away at alarming speed. These troops from June and July were already deployed in August and September (some even in late July), they were used to create a solid third strategic defensive echelon on Moscow axis which stood in front of Typhoon (Moscow offensive) as second was already destroyed in Smolensk battle and to save Leningrad. Very significantly these new units were the ones used in late July and August to hit exposed and unsupplied fast units of AGC east of Smolensk which had enormous effect on sapping their strength and very possibly forcing German hand away from Moscow and toward Ukraine. Huge merit for ill prepared Juners and Juliers..

Still even in crisis of such magnitude STAVKA(Red Army High Command ) didn’t neglect building of strategic reserves, and by 15th July there were 6 armies in STAVKA reserves. This generation of force, extreme both in scope and maybe even more in speed of getting the units ready was possible due to enormous numbers of reservists, already trained soldiers as military service was compulsory. Also of great significance were men that had WW1 and Civil War experience, those people weren’t very old yet, as Civil War ended mere 17 years ago. Furthermore there were countless sport or scout like organizations where youth were taught to shoot, drive and even fly airplanes on massive scale. Possession of these skills created ready pool of people useful to the army.

Speed of advance of German motorised formations under Luftwaffe umbrella against surprised and dispersed Soviet forces was catastrophic even if distances of vast Soviet land were taken into account. This advance gravely disrupted pre war plans of mobilization and limited the output of some of the most populated and developed provinces in the west of the country. For example in Western Special Military District 24 divisions were formed before the war and only three after it begun, in Kiev Special District 34 divisions were formed before the war and merely 4 after it began. By the end of the year nearly 70 million people from western parts of SU were living under nazi rule, in one strike removing one third(!) of workforce and potential manpower from the Soviet state. A deep, deep wound for the Soviet war making potential that is hardly ever discussed.

by Luka Bilić