(III)Mobilization, evolution and sustainability of Soviet army and war effort
Part 3.
‘Perifery’ of Soviet Union shows power and crisis in late 1941As large areas of western SU were already lost by August, Soviets couldn’t from early on count on many areas of greatest mobilization potential. To mitigate this other, traditionally, in importance secondary regions had to step forward. In late 1940 when Barbarossa was being planned Geography Department of the OKH was ordered to make a study of SU’s strengths and weaknesses and impact of geographic realities of coming invasion. Their report was unfavorable stressing vast distances unreachable to German logistical support, especially considering oil fields in Baku region and of special interest here, they stressed that far reaches of Soviet state weren’t wilderness any more as they were just few decades ago and that they represented a serious potential for the Soviets to wage protracted war as they were much more industrialized, agriculturally independent, infrastructurally built, more populated and so on. This study though amazingly astute was simply dismissed out of hand, not fitting into general Zieg Euphoria. Moreover these regions were reinforced with population evacuated from the west as well as industrial evacuation.
Therefore in August ‘provinces’ that traditionally looked to the core for supply and protection stepped up to help the struggling heartland. Huge force of 78 divisions, 10 rifle brigades and 20 tank brigades was created in August. Thus second wave of mobilization began. Some three quarters of these forces were created in ‘provinces’; Caucasus, lower Volga, Siberia, Urals..
While Germans were still slaughtering first Soviet( pre war) army and contemplating weather to go for Moscow or flanks, second Soviet army created in June and July was almost ready to take over and third one was already being prepared out of sight to push them back after second would finally stop them. This third army was mostly created in August and for the most part it was held back and trained and equipped for some four months before being used during winter counter offensives primarily at Moscow but also at Tikhvin, Rostov and so on.
Soviets were forced to use smaller part of these August forces before then intended, as crisis developed in Ukraine. In Kiev disaster, Stalin’s insistence to hold exposed and indefensible positions for political reasons played right into German hands and more than anything contributed to the loss of entire front with some 600 000 men. Mostly because of this, but also battles in other areas, September 1941 was for Soviets single most catastrophic month in the entire war with 53 divisions entirely destroyed! This forced Soviet command to commit part of still poorly trained August forces in October in eastern Ukraine. Despite their short training, Germans were stunned to see another continuous front appearing from thin air in front of them right after biggest Kesselschlacht (destruction after encirclement) in history.
Second wave continued to be raised in September, when additional 20 divisions were formed, again mostly coming from ‘provinces’, this time Central Asia. These units had some 3 months of training in main. Significantly in September as much as 34 new tank brigades were formed.
In October while Germans and pretty much everybody save top men from GKO and STAVKA thought fate of the war was being decided at Vyazma and Bryansk, another 18 divisions were formed and additional 55(!) rifle brigades(mostly from naval personnel).
In November 11 more divisions, 18 brigades and 9 tank brigades were formed, 6 of them in Far East to guard against still feared Japanese invasion, in spite of myth that Soviets were at ease after Sorge’s tip in October.
End of November marked the end of second wave of mobilization that started in August. Well structured and organized part of second wave ended in September, while in October and November creation of units became more erratic. Signs of crisis began to take shape. After men coming of military age were called as well as reservists, from September older men were also being included many of whom fought in WW1. In October numerous brigades were made mostly from naval personnel (marines, sailors) whose services weren’t needed in biggest land war in history. Also stocks of equipment were largely spent so new units lacked supporting units (tanks, transport, signal, anti air and anti tank), above all artillery. Thus so many brigades were made and not divisions that had standardized and prescribed amount of support units. Brigades on the other hand had little more than rifle units and had to rely on mother formation (army) to provide support for specific missions. In addition to stocks of weapons running out, production of new ones fell all time low in late 1941.
Thousands of factories were lost in western SU and those saved were in relocation process and still weren’t producing anything. Tank production was less than 20% of pre war figures. But most critical was ammunition production; huge number of chemical plants, carefully mustered in five year plans to avoid explosives shortages like in WW1, were lost. Also some 300 ammunition factories were overrun by November, which were producing staggering 100 million artillery shells(casings), 36 million mines and 24 million bombs per year. Consequently production of vital artillery shells fell from 5 million rounds in August to 3 million in December (average monthly consumption in 1941 was around 8,5 million shells). Steel production fell from 11.4 million tons in first six months to just 3,9 million in second half. Major rare mineral and power producing assets were lost in Ukraine as well as vast agricultural potential. On top of that almost third of workforce was now living under German joke and were already exploited for German war effort (food production and so on) and would be ever more by directly sending slave labour to the Reich to fuel their war effort.
This was the time of crisis, with all of the above plus almost five million soldiers lost in 1941 and Germans right before Moscow, things didn’t look bright. Now was a window opportunity for the nazis to take advantage of temporarily stunned Soviet bear which wouldn’t be given again.. Yet nazis lacked the strength to exploit Soviet crisis due to debilitating losses inflicted by countless little cuts by relentless and heroic Red Army resistance, loss of potency of fast units that weren’t preserved but recklessly used and spent in over demanding missions and unsuitable roles, and of course being beyond their effective supply range and capacity to project power.
‘Perifery’ of Soviet Union shows power and crisis in late 1941As large areas of western SU were already lost by August, Soviets couldn’t from early on count on many areas of greatest mobilization potential. To mitigate this other, traditionally, in importance secondary regions had to step forward. In late 1940 when Barbarossa was being planned Geography Department of the OKH was ordered to make a study of SU’s strengths and weaknesses and impact of geographic realities of coming invasion. Their report was unfavorable stressing vast distances unreachable to German logistical support, especially considering oil fields in Baku region and of special interest here, they stressed that far reaches of Soviet state weren’t wilderness any more as they were just few decades ago and that they represented a serious potential for the Soviets to wage protracted war as they were much more industrialized, agriculturally independent, infrastructurally built, more populated and so on. This study though amazingly astute was simply dismissed out of hand, not fitting into general Zieg Euphoria. Moreover these regions were reinforced with population evacuated from the west as well as industrial evacuation.
Therefore in August ‘provinces’ that traditionally looked to the core for supply and protection stepped up to help the struggling heartland. Huge force of 78 divisions, 10 rifle brigades and 20 tank brigades was created in August. Thus second wave of mobilization began. Some three quarters of these forces were created in ‘provinces’; Caucasus, lower Volga, Siberia, Urals..
While Germans were still slaughtering first Soviet( pre war) army and contemplating weather to go for Moscow or flanks, second Soviet army created in June and July was almost ready to take over and third one was already being prepared out of sight to push them back after second would finally stop them. This third army was mostly created in August and for the most part it was held back and trained and equipped for some four months before being used during winter counter offensives primarily at Moscow but also at Tikhvin, Rostov and so on.
Soviets were forced to use smaller part of these August forces before then intended, as crisis developed in Ukraine. In Kiev disaster, Stalin’s insistence to hold exposed and indefensible positions for political reasons played right into German hands and more than anything contributed to the loss of entire front with some 600 000 men. Mostly because of this, but also battles in other areas, September 1941 was for Soviets single most catastrophic month in the entire war with 53 divisions entirely destroyed! This forced Soviet command to commit part of still poorly trained August forces in October in eastern Ukraine. Despite their short training, Germans were stunned to see another continuous front appearing from thin air in front of them right after biggest Kesselschlacht (destruction after encirclement) in history.
Second wave continued to be raised in September, when additional 20 divisions were formed, again mostly coming from ‘provinces’, this time Central Asia. These units had some 3 months of training in main. Significantly in September as much as 34 new tank brigades were formed.
In October while Germans and pretty much everybody save top men from GKO and STAVKA thought fate of the war was being decided at Vyazma and Bryansk, another 18 divisions were formed and additional 55(!) rifle brigades(mostly from naval personnel).
In November 11 more divisions, 18 brigades and 9 tank brigades were formed, 6 of them in Far East to guard against still feared Japanese invasion, in spite of myth that Soviets were at ease after Sorge’s tip in October.
End of November marked the end of second wave of mobilization that started in August. Well structured and organized part of second wave ended in September, while in October and November creation of units became more erratic. Signs of crisis began to take shape. After men coming of military age were called as well as reservists, from September older men were also being included many of whom fought in WW1. In October numerous brigades were made mostly from naval personnel (marines, sailors) whose services weren’t needed in biggest land war in history. Also stocks of equipment were largely spent so new units lacked supporting units (tanks, transport, signal, anti air and anti tank), above all artillery. Thus so many brigades were made and not divisions that had standardized and prescribed amount of support units. Brigades on the other hand had little more than rifle units and had to rely on mother formation (army) to provide support for specific missions. In addition to stocks of weapons running out, production of new ones fell all time low in late 1941.
Thousands of factories were lost in western SU and those saved were in relocation process and still weren’t producing anything. Tank production was less than 20% of pre war figures. But most critical was ammunition production; huge number of chemical plants, carefully mustered in five year plans to avoid explosives shortages like in WW1, were lost. Also some 300 ammunition factories were overrun by November, which were producing staggering 100 million artillery shells(casings), 36 million mines and 24 million bombs per year. Consequently production of vital artillery shells fell from 5 million rounds in August to 3 million in December (average monthly consumption in 1941 was around 8,5 million shells). Steel production fell from 11.4 million tons in first six months to just 3,9 million in second half. Major rare mineral and power producing assets were lost in Ukraine as well as vast agricultural potential. On top of that almost third of workforce was now living under German joke and were already exploited for German war effort (food production and so on) and would be ever more by directly sending slave labour to the Reich to fuel their war effort.This was the time of crisis, with all of the above plus almost five million soldiers lost in 1941 and Germans right before Moscow, things didn’t look bright. Now was a window opportunity for the nazis to take advantage of temporarily stunned Soviet bear which wouldn’t be given again.. Yet nazis lacked the strength to exploit Soviet crisis due to debilitating losses inflicted by countless little cuts by relentless and heroic Red Army resistance, loss of potency of fast units that weren’t preserved but recklessly used and spent in over demanding missions and unsuitable roles, and of course being beyond their effective supply range and capacity to project power.
By Luka Bilić
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