Demands of secondary/potential fronts on Soviet forces

By Luka Bilić

It is widely known that Germans ‘couldn’t concentrate on Eastern Front’ during decisive period of war, the way Soviets could, because of demands of other fronts. This is certainly true to great degree especially regarding naval activities and air forces, the latter becoming significant from perhaps 1943. Regarding ground forces, distractions were continual presence in Norway, France and Afrika. I’m not going into details here, but I’ll mention that forces in France and Norway though several hundred thousand strong lacked mobile units and were for the most part made of ‘B’ class units, best suited for occupation and static defense duties. In Africa despite the name-Panzer Army Africa, there were actually only two panzer divisions there, one light division and later one more infantry division.

On the other side Soviets concentrated all of their effort on German front. Or did they? There were actually major distractions to main Soviet effort on their active front with Germany. These included forces to occupy Iran, forces tied on Turkish border, not to present easy opportunity to this potential enemy, and above all continuous strong presence in the Far East against powerful Japanese Kvantung Army of Manchuria.

Soviets secured full three armies in decisive summer of 1941 to occupy Iran in order to secure its oil and route for the Lend Lease. Occupation forces of unknown strength were left there for duration of the war and reinforced with newly raised units in 1942(one rifle division and one tank brigade). Turkey was always potential threat because of their aspirations in Caucasus region and constant German pressure to enter the war. Especially was this threat present when Germans entered this region during summer of 1942 and Soviets seemed to be on their last legs. Soviets reconnaissance planes in late summer of 1942 recorded massing of Turkish forces on the border. For this reason many units had to be maintained in the Transcaucausus region instead of being sent to active sectors where decisive battles were being fought. For example 261st Division, newly raised in September 1942 was sent specifically to reinforce Turkish border in time when hardest battles in and around Stalingrad raged (Kotluban offensives).

The mother of all distractions was Far East. Japanese Empire continuously tried to weaken or eliminate Russian presence in the Far East all the way back to war of 1905 to limited unofficial wars in late 30s(battles of Lake Khasan in 1938 and Halkin Gol in 1939). Invasion of SU from Manchuria was one of two main Japanese options, plans for invasion (code name Kantokuen) were allready detailed and approved by the Emperor. Planning was so advanced that even Russian would be puppet government was ready and waiting in Japan. Still, following more pragmatic approach, as Japan’s foremost need was oil, but also respecting Soviet arms that demonstrated limitations of Japanese land forces (battle of Nomonham(Halkin Gol)) and with non materializing Soviet collaps in face of German onslaught (derailment of Barbarossa at Smolensk) Imperial Staff opted for southern advance and securing of oil in Dutch East Indies. Nevertheless in late 1941 Kwantung Army was more than 700 000 men strong. Popular myth says that Far Eastern regions were confidently and strongly weakened in order to boost the western front after Soviet master spy Sorge informed Moscow that Japan wouldn’t attack in 1941. It was never that simple really. What Sorge actually gave wasn’t insurance, but probability that Japan wouldn’t attack if Soviet borders weren’t significantly weakened. There is huge difference between that and ‘assurance’ that theater is safe. Nor was it. Japanese didn’t drop the plans for invasion, they were simply on hold, with its proponents ever trying to get it going. Soviets intelligence net went deep into Japanese structures. Head of military police of Kwantung army was Soviet agent giving them first rate intelligence , another agent Kozo Izumi provided Soviets with the Japanese diplomatic codes back in 30s, so they monitored the development of situation, and military codes were broken by Soviet officers Tolstoy and Aronsky in 1941/42. With all this info at its disposal Soviet command classified threat of Japanese invasion as extremly high in 1941 and very high in 1942 and early 1943. Indeed after temporary lending of forces for first few months of expansion, in spring of 1942 Kwantung Army was heavily reinforced and reached its zenith with 1 220 000 men available (120 000 Koreans) and 1500 aircrafts. For all these reasons, Soviet Far Eastern Front was never heavily weakened and actually didn’t play important role in Moscow Battle, despite popular belief.

In June 1941 overall strength of Soviet Far Eastern forces was some 700 000 men. Dispite fearful and catastrophic events taking place in the west, where entire pre war army was being destroyed within weeks due to German sucker punch invasion and ineffectivlly prepared defences, Soviet command felt obligated to transfer units from the east, yet only very sparingly. Of the reserves deployed in Far Eastern fronts only two divisions were sent west in June( one tank and one mechanised), in July just three more followed(one mountain, one rifle and one mountain cavalry). A mere drop in the sea compared to events unfolding on German front. In August none were sent, three in September, 6 in October and 5 in November. Of these, 3 weren’t from the east but from Central Asia (two of them small cavalry divisions) and two were tank divisions. This would make a total of 19 divisions coming from the east from June to December 1941(and only 16 coming from the Far East and theoretically weakening front with Japan), though there are sources that say 17 divisions came and even as few as 7. Of these units only 11 took part in Moscow battle (some sources say 6), making little over 10% of forces involved in Moscow counter offensive, while others were used at Smolensk, Leningrad and Finnish front. Yet while these forces were moving west, there were frentic efforts to compansate for them in Far Eastern districts. Thus in 1941 in the Far East 12 new rifle divisions were formed, 4 rifle brigades and even 6 tank brigades. All these new units were deployed there and old ones already there brought up to strength. So by 1/12/1941 number of Soviet troops in the Far East jumped by more then 50% compared to June, from more than 700 000 to more than 1 300 000, though they had fewer heavy weapons. Still in December there were still 8777 guns and mortars, 2124 tanks and 3193 planes in the Soviet far east. Also during September 1941, 7 rifle divisions were formed which weren’t assigned to active fronts or reserve and were probably used on Turkish border, Iran or Far East.

In 1942 Soviets continued to strengthen their Far Eastern forces even though Japan entered war with America and Britain. Intelligence coming from Japan and especially Kwantung army itself still showed they were looking for Soviet signs of weakness and still hoping to invade after spring thaw of 1942 would pass. In accordance with this Kwantung Army was heavily reinforced in 1942. Soviets parried this and created 12 rifle brigades, 5 rifle divisions and 15 tank brigades in period from January to June 1942 for a net gain of more than 100 000 men, 3000 guns and mortars and some 450 tanks by 1/7/42. As in previous year German summer offensive created a dire crisis in the west, but as in 1941 reserves from Far East were used sparingly and cautiously. Two divisions were sent in January, and ten more, plus 4 brigades in July. Again great effort was made to make good of those transfers to critical Stalingrad front. Large transfer of July(still less then 10% of total Far Eastern forces) were facilitated by Soviet knowledge of turning of a tide on Pacific battlefield(battles of Coral Sea and especially Midway) and coresponding change of mood within Japanese command regarding war with SU. Though in second half of 1942 13 more rifle brigades and 3 tank brigades were created in Far East, by mid November 1942 Soviets reduced their Far Eastern forces compared to beginning of July by some 150 000 men,resulting to both crisis in Stalingrad sector and reduced threat of invasion, but increased numbers of heavy weapons-guns and mortars by 1000 and airplanes by 200. Still Manchurian border was guarded by 1.3 million soldiers. With Japanese threat further diminishing as their situation constantly changed for worse on the Pacific, and Soviet position on German front becoming increasingly dominant after Stalingrad, Japanese threat was reevaluated and Soviets allowed themselves to use Far Eastern forces as pool of reserves but as before very cautiously. Thus in mid 1943 compared to November 1942 there were some 140 000 troops less in the Far East and by the beginning of 1944 another 50 000 were gone. Still all this time numbers of artillery and war planes rised, while number of tanks slightly dropped. Number of troops never went below 1.1 million.

In conclusion Soviets, just like Germans had major distractions on secondary fronts. In fact roughly 20% of Soviet strength was tied in the Far East, not to mention commitments in Iran and constant guard of Turkish border. It is truly impressive that even in most desperate times of 1941 Soviets payed such attention to that remote border that it actually grew in strength by some 50% though heavy weapons slightly decreased in number. Still during German high tide period in battle for Moscow, Soviets were creating no less than 6 tank brigades in Far East. This was backed by superb, intimate knowledge of Japanese intentions and situation that was itself complicated, flexible and ever changing. Main difference between SU and Germany was that Soviets payed greatest attention to strengthening their Eastern forces in 1941/42 according with level of Japanese threat. Unfortunately that was also the time when German threat was greatest and outcome of war was hanging in balance on Soviet German front. Later when Soviet position in war with Germany became comfortable, only than actually did Soviets allow themself to make more use of Eastern reserves due to changed Japanese situation. Oppositely Germany had pretty clear shot at SU in 1941 and concentrated everything that was battle worthy on Eastern Front. In 1942 western front was starved even more. By mid 1943 German distractions began to grow, just as Soviet ones were becoming less and less important.