MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS OF 1939
MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS OF 1939 - negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France on the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance.
In an atmosphere of increasing aggressive aspirations of Germany, the Soviet leadership on March 18, 1939 turned to the governments of Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey with a proposal to convene a special meeting. The British government rejected the Soviet proposal, declaring the holding of such a meeting "premature." Having provided guarantees to Poland in March - April 1939, and then (together with France) to Greece and Romania, the British government in mid-April invited the USSR to provide similar guarantees to neighboring European states.
The Soviet leadership did not accept the British proposal, indicating that these states did not make such a request to the USSR, and Great Britain and France did not declare their readiness to assume obligations to provide assistance to the USSR in the event of its entry into the war.
On April 14, the French government approached the USSR with a proposal to supplement the text of the Soviet-French pact of 1935 (see Soviet-French treaties and agreements) with an obligation of mutual assistance in the event of a German attack on Poland or Romania. In response to British and French initiatives, the Soviet government on April 17 proposed to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance (for a period of 5-10 years) and a military convention. The Soviet proposal was accepted, after which discussion of the draft treaty began.
Of key importance was the position of the British government. The draft declaration he proposed on May 8 provided for the USSR’s obligations to assist Britain and France in the event of a German attack on Poland or Romania. The draft did not indicate British and French obligations to assist the USSR in the event of a German attack on itself or on the Baltic states.
In May - June, the main point of contradictions in the negotiations was clearly outlined: the issue of guaranteeing the security of Latvia, Estonia and Finland by the three powers. The issue of ensuring the security of the Baltic states was of fundamental importance to the USSR, since the aggression of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union could develop in the Baltic direction. On the issue of providing these guarantees, Great Britain and France took a evasive position.
During the negotiations in Moscow (June 15 - July 23) between V.M. Molotov, the British Ambassador W. Sides, the French Ambassador P. Najiar and the head of the Central European Department to the British Foreign Office, W. Strang, reached a compromise: trilateral security guarantees to the Baltic states (as well as Poland, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium) were not decided mention in the main the text of the contract, and stipulate them in a secret supplement. protocol. 2 questions remained not completely resolved: what should be considered “indirect aggression” and what should be the actions of the parties in the event of a German attack on a European state not mentioned in the protocol. However, these disagreements were recognized as secondary, which allowed Britain and France to accept owls. proposal for the beginning of the military. negotiation.
The British delegation, led by the adjutant of the king, Admiral R. Drax and France, led by a member of the Supreme Military Council, General of the Army J. Dumenk, arrived in Moscow only on August 12. and french. governments, the low level of representatives sent by them to the negotiations, were taken by owls. leadership as a sign of the unpreparedness of official circles in Great Britain and France to conclude an agreement with the USSR. In addition, at the very first meeting it turned out that Drax and Dumenk had the authority only to negotiate, but not to sign a military convention (Dumenk received such authority only on August 22). At the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov parties made reports on the state of their armed forces and military plans.Soviet military plans, presented by the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov, provided that in the event of a war in Europe, the USSR is ready to put up 120 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9-10 thousand tanks, 5-5.5 thousand combat aircraft. The Soviet side also proposed 3 options for possible joint action by the Soviet, French and British armed forces. The reports of the French and British delegations did not provide specific data on the armies of Great Britain and France and their operational plans in case of war.Serious disagreement at the talks was caused by the question of the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania, without which they could not start military operations against the German army. The Polish government categorically objected to the passage of Soviet troops. France’s attempts to persuade the Polish leadership to agree to the passage of Soviet troops have not yielded results. Only on August 23, upon learning of the arrival of German Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop to Moscow, did the Polish Foreign Minister, J. Beck, recognize the possibility of joint Soviet-Polish actions against Germany.In the absence of clear prospects for the three powers to conclude a convention on joint counteraction of German aggression, the Soviet government, which, like the British leadership, held parallel negotiations with Berlin, accepted Germany’s proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty, and Germany, in turn, agreed to differentiate between geographical "spheres of interests" USSR in Eastern Europe.After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, Moscow negotiations were terminated.
Historical sources:
Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939. Ser. 3. L., 1953. Vol. 7;
Negotiations of military missions of the USSR, England and France in Moscow in August 1939 // International life. 1959. No. 2–3;
USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of World War II (Sept. 1938 - Aug. 1939): Documents and materials. M., 1971;
Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War, 1937-1939. M., 1981. T. 2;
Documents diplomatiques français 1932–1939. 2 série. P., 1984-1985. Vol. 17-18;
Political negotiations of the USSR, Great Britain and France in 1939 in the light of French diplomatic documents // New and modern history. 1989. No. 6;
Year of crisis. 1938–1939: Documents and materials. M., 1990. T. 1–2;
Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1992.V. 22. Book. 1.
Additional literature:
Pankrashova M., Sipols V. Why it was not possible to prevent the war: Moscow negotiations of the USSR, England and France 1939: Documentary review. M., 1973;
Read A., Fisher D. The deadly embrase: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941. L., 1988;
Sipols V.Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II. 2nd ed. M., 1989;
1939: History Lessons / Ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky. M., 1990;
Roberts G. The Soviet Union and the origins of the Second World War: Russo-German relations and the road to war, 1933–1941. Basingstoke, 1995.
© Great Russian Encyclopedia (BDT)
Drax and Dumenk at the Leningrad Station in Moscow. 1939 year
A prerequisite for the start of the Moscow talks was the aggravation of the military-political situation in Europe after the capture of Czechoslovakia by the German troops (March 1939).In an atmosphere of increasing aggressive aspirations of Germany, the Soviet leadership on March 18, 1939 turned to the governments of Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey with a proposal to convene a special meeting. The British government rejected the Soviet proposal, declaring the holding of such a meeting "premature." Having provided guarantees to Poland in March - April 1939, and then (together with France) to Greece and Romania, the British government in mid-April invited the USSR to provide similar guarantees to neighboring European states.
The Soviet leadership did not accept the British proposal, indicating that these states did not make such a request to the USSR, and Great Britain and France did not declare their readiness to assume obligations to provide assistance to the USSR in the event of its entry into the war.
On April 14, the French government approached the USSR with a proposal to supplement the text of the Soviet-French pact of 1935 (see Soviet-French treaties and agreements) with an obligation of mutual assistance in the event of a German attack on Poland or Romania. In response to British and French initiatives, the Soviet government on April 17 proposed to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance (for a period of 5-10 years) and a military convention. The Soviet proposal was accepted, after which discussion of the draft treaty began.
Of key importance was the position of the British government. The draft declaration he proposed on May 8 provided for the USSR’s obligations to assist Britain and France in the event of a German attack on Poland or Romania. The draft did not indicate British and French obligations to assist the USSR in the event of a German attack on itself or on the Baltic states.
In May - June, the main point of contradictions in the negotiations was clearly outlined: the issue of guaranteeing the security of Latvia, Estonia and Finland by the three powers. The issue of ensuring the security of the Baltic states was of fundamental importance to the USSR, since the aggression of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union could develop in the Baltic direction. On the issue of providing these guarantees, Great Britain and France took a evasive position.
During the negotiations in Moscow (June 15 - July 23) between V.M. Molotov, the British Ambassador W. Sides, the French Ambassador P. Najiar and the head of the Central European Department to the British Foreign Office, W. Strang, reached a compromise: trilateral security guarantees to the Baltic states (as well as Poland, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium) were not decided mention in the main the text of the contract, and stipulate them in a secret supplement. protocol. 2 questions remained not completely resolved: what should be considered “indirect aggression” and what should be the actions of the parties in the event of a German attack on a European state not mentioned in the protocol. However, these disagreements were recognized as secondary, which allowed Britain and France to accept owls. proposal for the beginning of the military. negotiation.
The British delegation, led by the adjutant of the king, Admiral R. Drax and France, led by a member of the Supreme Military Council, General of the Army J. Dumenk, arrived in Moscow only on August 12. and french. governments, the low level of representatives sent by them to the negotiations, were taken by owls. leadership as a sign of the unpreparedness of official circles in Great Britain and France to conclude an agreement with the USSR. In addition, at the very first meeting it turned out that Drax and Dumenk had the authority only to negotiate, but not to sign a military convention (Dumenk received such authority only on August 22). At the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov parties made reports on the state of their armed forces and military plans.Soviet military plans, presented by the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov, provided that in the event of a war in Europe, the USSR is ready to put up 120 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9-10 thousand tanks, 5-5.5 thousand combat aircraft. The Soviet side also proposed 3 options for possible joint action by the Soviet, French and British armed forces. The reports of the French and British delegations did not provide specific data on the armies of Great Britain and France and their operational plans in case of war.Serious disagreement at the talks was caused by the question of the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania, without which they could not start military operations against the German army. The Polish government categorically objected to the passage of Soviet troops. France’s attempts to persuade the Polish leadership to agree to the passage of Soviet troops have not yielded results. Only on August 23, upon learning of the arrival of German Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop to Moscow, did the Polish Foreign Minister, J. Beck, recognize the possibility of joint Soviet-Polish actions against Germany.In the absence of clear prospects for the three powers to conclude a convention on joint counteraction of German aggression, the Soviet government, which, like the British leadership, held parallel negotiations with Berlin, accepted Germany’s proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty, and Germany, in turn, agreed to differentiate between geographical "spheres of interests" USSR in Eastern Europe.After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, Moscow negotiations were terminated.
Historical sources:
Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939. Ser. 3. L., 1953. Vol. 7;
Negotiations of military missions of the USSR, England and France in Moscow in August 1939 // International life. 1959. No. 2–3;
USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of World War II (Sept. 1938 - Aug. 1939): Documents and materials. M., 1971;
Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War, 1937-1939. M., 1981. T. 2;
Documents diplomatiques français 1932–1939. 2 série. P., 1984-1985. Vol. 17-18;
Political negotiations of the USSR, Great Britain and France in 1939 in the light of French diplomatic documents // New and modern history. 1989. No. 6;
Year of crisis. 1938–1939: Documents and materials. M., 1990. T. 1–2;
Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1992.V. 22. Book. 1.
Additional literature:
Pankrashova M., Sipols V. Why it was not possible to prevent the war: Moscow negotiations of the USSR, England and France 1939: Documentary review. M., 1973;
Read A., Fisher D. The deadly embrase: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941. L., 1988;
Sipols V.Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II. 2nd ed. M., 1989;
1939: History Lessons / Ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky. M., 1990;
Roberts G. The Soviet Union and the origins of the Second World War: Russo-German relations and the road to war, 1933–1941. Basingstoke, 1995.
© Great Russian Encyclopedia (BDT)
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